PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Atlas

Central Intelligence Agency
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Atlas

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PREFACE

This volume goes beyond the scope of a conventional atlas. It presents a wider variety of information, including geographic, economic, historical, and cultural data. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, it employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts, and photographs. The publication is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the People’s Republic of China. To make so much information about such a complex and little-known country as meaningful as possible, a great deal of it is placed in a familiar context -- that is, by drawing comparisons between China and the United States.
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Let's attack here!
Drive away the mountain gods,
Break down the stone walls
To bring out those 200 million tons of coal.

Let's strike here!
Let the Dragon King change his job,
Let the river climb the hills,
Let us ask it for 8000 acres of rice paddies.

Let that valley open its bosom
To yield 500 catties of oats every year.
Cut down the knoll
To make a plain over there...

Let's wage war against the great earth!
Let the mountains and rivers surrender under our feet.
March on nature,
Let's take over the power of rain and wind.

We shall tolerate not a single inch of unused land!
Nor a single place harassed by disaster.
Make wet rice, wheat, and yellow corn grow on top of the mountain,
And beans, peanuts, and red kaoliang rise on sheer rocks...

"An inch of time is an inch of gold,"
That's the value of yesterday.
Time's worth today
Is "An inch for ten thousand pieces of gold."

Chang Chih-min, *Personalities in the Commune*
Introduction to China

China's central location in Asia, immense area and population, and legacy of cultural superiority have given it a dominant role in Asian affairs. Tempering these factors of strength, however, are serious limitations. China must grow sufficient food for its rapidly increasing population, and also provide raw materials for the expansion of industry, from a land of limited and already extensively exploited agricultural resources. The regional character of China—the distribution of physical features, population, and resources—provides a framework for an understanding and evaluation of the problems and developments within the People's Republic of China.

Physical Characteristics—China often is compared to the United States since both are about equal in area—China has nearly 3.7 million square miles and the United States slightly more than 3.6 million—and both occupy similar latitudes. Differences, however, are more important than similarities, and perhaps none is of greater significance than the higher proportion of land in China unsuited for intensive agriculture and settlement. Most of China consists of hills, mountains, and high plateaus; only 12 percent of the surface is in plains and about 19 percent in basins. Most of the basins contain semiarid and arid deserts which, though flat to rolling, are of little agricultural use. Only 11 percent of China is now under cultivation, and little additional land is physically or economically suitable to augment this total.

The major mountain systems of China are oriented west to east, a characteristic that is most pronounced in western China, where the massive Tien Shan, Kunluns, and Himalayas extend eastward more than 1,000 miles. In eastern China extensions of these ranges are often broken and at considerably lower elevations; nevertheless, they are of sufficient size to form physical barriers to north-south transport, separate different types of climate and vegetation, and serve as regional boundaries. The major rivers of China—the Huang (Yellow), Yangtze, and Hsi—also drain from west to east. The middle and lower basins of these great rivers provide the physical framework within which distinctive patterns of settlement and land use have evolved. In the fertile plains and valleys of these rivers, separated from one another by hills and mountains, lies most of the good agricultural land, the bulk of the rural population, and the more important transportation facilities and industrial areas.

Population and Ethnic Characteristics—About 95 percent of China's population lives in the eastern half of the country. Adequate precipitation for agriculture is the key factor explaining this east-west population contrast, though high elevations and steep slopes as well as limited rainfall are contributing factors to the scanty population of western China. Ethnic contrasts also are sharp. Almost all of the dominant Han Chinese majority are concentrated in eastern China; a number of minority groups, of mostly Mongolid racial stock, but with distinctive linguistic and cultural traits, predominate in western China. The political and economic integration of these diverse peoples of western China has been a major policy objective of the Chinese leadership.

Regional Divisions—The major regional divisions of China shown on the map are defined primarily by climatic patterns and the generally west-to-east alignment of major mountain ranges. Western China consists of two distinctive regions—the Tibetan Highlands and the desert basins and desolate mountains of Sinkiang-Mongolia— which combined comprise slightly more than half of China's total area but contain only 5 percent of her total population. High mountains and plateaus, large deserts, and extensive grasslands are characteristic of these western regions; only locally do fertile river valleys have sufficient water resources to support a sedentary agricultural population.

Eastern China includes about 46 percent of the land area of the country and almost all of the population. It is divided into four traditional regions—Northeast, North, South, and Southwest China, each possessing distinctive physical and cultural features. Cultural variants from region to region, mainly linguistic, are less important than the common cultural bonds that prevail in eastern China. The distinctive features of each of the major regions are examined on subsequent pages of this atlas. The Inner Mongolia area of Sinkiang-Mongolia is treated as a part of the North map and text for cartographic convenience.
Northeast China—the provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning—is the most important industrial region of the country and a nationally significant and still-developing center of agricultural production. Most of the Northeast remained largely unpopulated and unaffected by Han Chinese culture until about a century ago, although tenuous political ties with China had existed, specifically with the southernmost sector of the Manchurian Plain, from very early times. It was, in fact, a frontier region that often served as a base for nomadic invaders who periodically threatened, and at times controlled, parts of North China. The severe population pressures in North China during the 19th century ago, although tenuous political ties with China had existed, specifically with the southernmost sector of the Manchurian Plain, from very early times. It was, in fact, a frontier region that often served as a base for nomadic invaders who periodically threatened, and at times controlled, parts of North China.

The heart of this region is the extensive Northeast or Manchurian Plain, the largest in the country. Almost encircled by hills and low mountains, it opens only to Po Hai (Gulf of Chihli) in the southwest and through the restricted Sungari river valley to the frontier with the USSR in the northeast. Despite frequent spring droughts and a relatively brief growing season, the Manchurian Plain is highly productive agriculturally, and it is here that most of the region’s population and economic activity is centered. The Greater and Lesser Khingan Ranges to the northwest, north, and northeast and the highland complex of hills and low mountains adjoining North Korea are economically important because of their extensive stands of timber and their important coal deposits.

Northeast China contains the best-developed transportation net in the country. An extensive rail system—the densest in China—links all of the major population concentrations with regional market towns, major sources of industrial raw materials, and fuel resources. Though the initial development of the railroads dates to earlier periods of Russian and Japanese occupation, they have been substantially improved by the Chinese in recent years. Many of the old Japanese lines leading to the Soviet frontier have been rebuilt, a number of rail lines serving forestry areas have been expanded, and the capacity of the basic rail net has been increased. Though more localized, the Sungari river is a regionally important means of transporting forest and agricultural products.

The forests of the Northeast comprise nearly two-thirds of the nation’s forest resources. Lying primarily in the Khingan Ranges, and to a lesser extent in the southeastern highland complex, these forests are undergoing intense exploitation by the Chinese, who are pressed for timber supplies and wood by-products.

Though Northeast China’s population is now overwhelmingly Han Chinese and integrated into the national economy, there are important minorities, particularly of Korean farmers who live in valleys close to the Korean border. A few Mongol groups live partially within and to the west of the Greater Khingan Range. Manchus, once numerous, are now largely absorbed within Chinese culture. Though only a few Russians remain, they left an architectural imprint on the northeastern cities that is visible in the bulbous spires of the Eastern Orthodox Churches. However, they, like the Japanese, left their most important legacy in the form of an impressive industrial and transportation complex.
Timber operations in the Khingan Mountains. These sparsely populated ranges contain the largest concentration of timber resources in China. Timber operations are widespread throughout these hills and low mountains and constitute the most characteristic land use.

Harvesting wheat on the Manchurian Plain. Agricultural production, particularly of soybeans and dry field grains, is characteristic of the plain. Its extensive level land is more adaptable to mechanization than are most agricultural areas in China. The plain has the largest population concentrations in the Northeast, several important mineral deposits and most of the region's industrial base.

Agricultural valley in the southeastern highlands. Small agricultural valleys, surrounded by hills and low mountains, are focal points for most of the people and economic activity within the highland complex. Here, as in the Khingan Mountains, forestry is economically significant, particularly in the more isolated locations in the eastern part of the highlands. Though more localized, there are also several areas where mineral exploitation is the most important economic activity.
North

North China includes the densely populated and intensively cultivated North China Plain, the loess-covered uplands of Shansi, northern Shansi, and eastern Kansu, and the sparsely populated, semiarid steppes of Inner Mongolia. Historically, often-hostile nomadic groups surged across the steppe to threaten and occasionally invade the prosperous cities and adjoining rural districts of North China. Separating these two distinct worlds—the grasslands from intensively cultivated valleys and plains—is the Great Wall. The Wall, actually a series of walls built at different times, was constructed by the Chinese to limit and control contact between themselves and the “barbarians” of the steppes.

Ancient Chinese civilization began in the Wei Ho Valley and in contiguous areas of present-day Shensi, Shansi, and Honan; in time it gradually expanded to incorporate the North China Plain. Fertile and easily tilled soil, extensive plains, and an adequate climate (at times marginal in terms of rainfall) proved conducive to the development of intensive forms of agriculture and relatively high population densities. The North has been the politically and culturally dominant region of China throughout most of history, although recurrent droughts, floods, famines, and periodic invasions from the northern steppes have from time to time shifted the political and economic base southward to the middle and lower Yangtze regions.

The advantages of the North have in recent times been reasserted and its primacy has been reinforced by a homogeneous Han Chinese population that shares a common culture and language, terrain that is suitable for road and rail construction, and the mineral and power resources needed by modern industry. Major industrial districts in North China are located in a triangle formed by the cities of Peking, T’ang-shan, and Tientsin; at T’ai-yuan; in northern Honan at Cheng-chou and Lo-yang; and at Pao-t’ou. Iron and steel, agricultural machinery, and textiles are some of the major products. Plentiful supplies of coal, located at numerous mines that rim the North China Plain, are available; major iron ore deposits also occur.

West of the North China Plain are the physically diverse lands of Shensi, Shansi, and eastern Kansu, where almost everywhere landforms are blanketed by thick layers of fine-grained, yellow loessial (wind-deposited) soils. The characteristic landscape is one of steep-sided valleys, gullies, and cliffs, often contoured into even more intricate forms by man-made terraces. The favorable physical environment in the loess area nurtured early civilization, but the high variability of rainfall in the Yellow River drainage basin and unchecked erosion are major river-control factors. Centuries of deposition has raised the streambed above the surrounding land; consequently, failure to maintain the dikes can cause the loss of a season’s crop in large areas adjacent to the river. In 1955 a comprehensive Yellow River Plan was announced; it proposed flood control measures, the production of hydroelectric power, the provision of irrigation water, and the improvement of stream navigability. A key project—a major dam and associated hydroelectric facilities—was begun at San-men Gorge, just west of the North China Plain; smaller dams and reservoirs were constructed upstream to help control runoff, prevent silting, and provide hydroelectric power. In spite of some progress in soil conservation, including reforestation, and the building and maintenance of dikes, the heavy load of silt carried by the Yellow River apparently has been a major factor preventing operation of the San-men facilities.

North China is plagued with problems that have arisen out of a history of intense population pressures upon the region’s rich but fragile agricultural resources. In the past the lack of effective government controls to preserve these resources led to increased abuse of the physical environment; highly variable amounts of rainfall accentuated the problems, causing droughts, floods, and often famines. The preservation, rebuilding, and harnessing of the land resources through a variety of land and water conservancy programs have provided Chinese planners with one of their most severe tests.
Hydroelectric power project, San-men Gorge, Huang Ho (Yellow River). The control of the Huang Ho has been a continuous problem for Chinese planners for centuries. The building of a dam and power station at San-men Gorge was the beginning of a comprehensive plan for flood control, power production, irrigation, and navigation of the Huang Ho. The dam was completed in 1962 but, because of excessive silting, the power plant has never been operative.

Terraced fields in the loesslands of Shansi Province. Flat agricultural land is at a premium in the loesslands, and insufficient and variable rainfall and the eroded terrain make farming difficult. The government promotes model-farm production brigades to encourage development of agriculture through the use of improved soil and water conservation techniques.

The Great Wall. In reality a series of walls, it was built over 2,000 years ago as a unified defensive barrier against nomadic invaders from the north. Through the centuries it also evolved as a practical line of demarcation -- separating pastoral nomadism from intensive, Chinese-style sedentary agriculture, based on the growing of grains.

Grasslands of A-pa-ha-na-erh-ch'i, Inner Mongolia. Herding is the predominant activity on the Inner Mongolian steppe. The yurt, a portable Mongol house, is a familiar feature on the grasslands. In the past, herding was nomadic. Now most Mongol families reside in villages, combining herding with limited agriculture.

Loess cave dwellings in Shensi Province. Caves in the Shansi-Shensi loesslands illustrate a practical approach to housing in this region. The caves require relatively few materials and can easily be cut into the steep-sided walls of the ravines in eroded loess areas, leaving all available flat land for cultivation.
South

South China comprises the drainage basins of the middle and lower Yangtze River, the basin of the Hai Chiang (West River) in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the mountainous coastal provinces of Fuken and Chekiang. The division between the North and South, the two most important regions in China, is sharp and distinct in the west, where hills and mountains act as a barrier to movement and form a significant climatic divide. In the east, however, where alluvial plains of the North and the South merge, topographic distinction between the major regions does not exist. Instead, the regional division occurs in a zone characterized by gradually increased precipitation and temperature from north to south, and by the transition in cropping patterns from wheat to rice.

The ethnic and linguistic pattern of South China is complex, being the product of repeated migrations and much local isolation. No other part of China, except the Southwest, has such a confusion of ethnic groups and dialects. Until about two thousand years ago South China was inhabited largely by non-Chinese tribes. Newcomers from the north repeatedly pushed the non-Chinese into the more inaccessible areas, and sometimes the newcomers themselves were later pushed into isolated areas by subsequent migrants from the north. Even after the region was fully incorporated into China in the third century A.D., newcomers escaping alien oppression or famine in various parts of North China continued to settle in South China, where the hilly and mountainous terrain served to perpetuate and accentuate their ethnic variations. Today Cantonese-speaking people prevail in southern Kwangtung and eastern Kwangsi, and they comprise the largest non-Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese ethnolinguistic group in South China.

Widely diverse landscapes, ranging from monotonously flat and densely populated lowlands to sparsely populated hills and mountains, characterize the South. Although the uplands make up more than 80 percent of the total land surface, the core of South China is the fertile Yangtze Plain—often divided into middle and lower parts. The Yangtze Plain exhibits a coherence not found in other parts of the region: the majority of South China’s population is located on or near it; it contains nearly all of the region’s major manufacturing centers; and it is the most prosperous port of South China that has a long tradition of interest in seafaring. Rivers here are short and swift, unnavigable, and without extensive floodplains. Each basin constitutes a unit isolated from other basins, except on the seaward side, and agriculture is restricted to small and scattered lowlands. Population pressure on the limited arable land, the presence of numerous protected coves and harbors in the deeply indented coast, and abundant forest resources have combined to give fishing and coastal trading an important place in the traditional life of the region.

The coastal zone south of the Yangtze is the only section of China that has a long tradition of interest in seafaring. Rivers here are short and swift, unnavigable, and without extensive floodplains. Each basin constitutes a unit isolated from other basins, except on the seaward side, and agriculture is restricted to small and scattered lowlands. Population pressure on the limited arable land, the presence of numerous protected coves and harbors in the deeply indented coast, and abundant forest resources have combined to give fishing and coastal trading an important place in the traditional life of the region.

The Nan Ling (southern mountains) form a watershed between the tributaries of the Yangtze and those of the Hai Chiang and lesser rivers flowing to the South China Sea; at the same time they form a climatic divide that shelters the region to the south from cold northern air masses in the winter. South of the divide hills predominate, and there is little level land. To the west the hills merge with the Yunnan-Kiochow Plateau of Southwest China in an area of striking karst topography, where steep-sided hills and grotesque pinnacles rise abruptly from small plains. In the east, from eastern Kwangtung to Chekiang, deeply dissected hills extend to the very coast of the South China Sea, producing an irregular coastline characterized by promontories, protected bays, and numerous offshore islands.

The principal river south of the Nan Ling is the Hai Chiang, which rises in the highlands of eastern Yunnan and southern Kwiochow. It flows eastward into Kwangtung, where it merges with the Pei Chiang (North River) and the Tung Chiang (East River) to form the Canton Delta—the most densely populated area of South China and one of the most highly developed agricultural areas in the world. The Canton Delta, also known as the Pearl River Delta, consists of fertile alluvium and a maze of distributaries and man-made canals. Not all of the delta is actually level; numerous hills of red sandstone have been enveloped, but not covered, by the advancing alluvium. Canton, which is situated at the northern edge of the delta, is the economic focus, principal population center, and leading manufacturing center south of the Nan Ling. Major industries include shipbuilding, steel manufacture, sugar refining, and food canning.

In most of southernmost China two crops of rice are grown every year, and in the Canton Delta and on Hainan Island three crops a year can be produced. Sweet potatoes, which are grown on drier lands, are also a major food crop. Sugarcane is a particularly important crop in the Canton Delta, and Kwangtung Province is mainland China’s leading sugar producer. The Nan Ling and the hills to the south contain a wide variety of ores, and small mines are scattered throughout the region. Most of the mines are of the open-pit type. Principal mineral resources include tungsten, antimony, manganese, oil shale, iron, tin, and coal.
Karst (limestone) landscape in western Kwangsi Province. A major category of Chinese painting, known as shan shui (mountain and water), often depicts bizarre landscapes of pinnacles and steep-sided hills protruding above mist-enshrouded lowlands. Many of the paintings are inspired by the unusual terrain of northern and western Kwangsi and adjacent southern Kweichow.

Rice fields on reclaimed land near Tung-t'ing Hu (Lake) in Hunan Province. Drained and cultivated, these fertile lowland tracts can be very productive. Double-cropping is practiced in this area, with winter wheat usually following rice. The reclaimed areas often serve as models.

Floating small logs downstream in Kwangtung Province. In South China bamboo rafts provide the most common means of transporting felled timber to the nearest sawmill or railroad. The rafts can generally be used the year round. Similar rafts carry passengers and local produce.

Experimental tea farm near Hang-chow, Chekiang Province. China's most important tea-producing regions are in Chekiang, and the province normally leads all others in total output.

Agricultural lowland in Fukien Province. Level land is found only in the small deltas and in small and scattered lowlands of each stream basin, but fertile alluvium and a long growing season make these lowlands highly productive. As shown here, adjoining valley sides may be terraced for rice where soil and sufficient water are available.
Southwest China includes the Szechwan Basin and the Yunnan-Kweichow Uplands—two contrasting regions that differ in physical character, historical development, and in population density and composition. They are alike, however, in that they share a common disadvantage—separation from eastern China by vast distances and difficult terrain. Their consequent isolation, modified only by limited transport, has complicated their economic and political integration into the mainstream of the nation. The Szechwan Basin—sometimes called the Red Basin because of the predominant color of its soil—is surrounded by mountains and drained by four major tributaries of the Yangtze (the name Szechwan, in fact, means “four rivers” in Chinese). One of the most densely settled and productive agricultural regions of China, it has hot summers, mild winters, and adequate rainfall for an almost year-round growing season. Much of the land in the Basin is hilly—a notable exception being the Ch'eng-tu Plain—but many slopes are gentle and easily terraced; approximately 35 percent of the total area is under cultivation. Ch'eng-tu, located in the most productive agricultural part of the Basin, was established as Szechwan's political and cultural center by about 300 B.C. The Ch'eng-tu Plain and the city of Ch'eng-tu mirror the agricultural systems and urban designs of early North China civilization. As a result of this contact with the north and subsequent Han settlement, the Szechwan Basin from early times has had a large Han Chinese population, but because of its insular location, the Basin has remained a distinctive region that has historically maintained at various times considerable administrative independence. The Yunnan-Kweichow Uplands include most of the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow as well as the mountains of southern Szechwan. Interspersed within the rugged, sparsely inhabited highlands are numerous saucer-shaped and densely populated intermontane basins. The high proportion of steep slopes and high elevations has restricted the amount of cultivated land to only 10 percent of the total, although reclamation of fertile lake basins in central Yunnan and the terracing of forested highland areas are expanding the cultivated area. Large-scale Han Chinese settlement of the Yunnan-Kweichow Plateau did not begin until the Ming rulers (1368-1644 A.D.) encouraged people in the area of the Yangtze Delta to migrate into Yunnan and Kweichow. As the Chinese expanded into the fertile basins of the uplands, they displaced indigenous ethnic groups, forcing them to migrate into remote valleys and highlands. Despite a large influx of Han Chinese in recent decades, the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow still have large numbers of these minority peoples, who comprise an estimated 30 percent of the population. In each of these provinces much effort has been directed toward political and economic integration of these minority groups. The modern economic development of Southwest China began shortly after the eruption of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. As the Chinese Nationalists retreated into the Southwest, they brought industrial plants piecemeal from eastern China; some indispensable parts of the Chinese machine industry, for example, were moved from Shanghai and Han-k'ou into K'un-ming and Ch'ung-ch'ing (Chungking), which became the wartime capital. By 1938 K'un-ming had doubled and Kuei-yang, the capital of Kweichow, tripled in population. The relocation of industry to the Southwest rather than to the Northwest was largely determined by the extent, relative location, and quality of coal and iron ore deposits. The movement of the industries and the subsequent migration of students, craftsmen, skilled labor, and technicians laid the foundation for the industrial expansion that has taken place in Southwest China since 1950. The key to economic development of the Southwest has been the construction of transportation lines that link areas of heavy industry to their sources of raw materials and to the markets of eastern China. Szechwan was the focus of early railroad construction, initially with the linking by rail in 1932 of its two major industrial cities—Ch'eng-tu and Ch'ung-ch'ing. The first external rail link from the province was completed in 1956 when Pao-chi, located in the Wei Ho Valley to the north, was connected to Ch'eng-tu. Subsequently, several other railroads have been built that connect the three provinces of the Southwest and serve the developing heavy industrial areas around Kuei-yang, K'un-ming, and Ch'ung-ch'ing. In addition, numerous roads have been built, particularly in the frontier regions of Yunnan bordering Burma and Laos. The economic development of Yunnan and Kweichow and the increase in the Han Chinese population of these provinces have resulted in further political and cultural pressures upon the numerous non-Han Chinese ethnic groups. A measure of autonomy for these minority nationalities exists in the form of sub-provincial autonomous administrative units. They have been established over large areas of Yunnan, where the greatest variety of ethnic groups is found and where minorities form a proportionately larger percentage of the population. The heaviest concentrations of Han Chinese are found in the larger lake basins around K'un-ming and Ta-li; their numbers decrease to the south and west. The Chinese have traditionally shunned the tropical valleys and basins of southern Yunnan and have been equally deterred by the rugged mountain lands to the west. Although the Chinese appear to have succeeded in pacifying most of the southwestern borderlands, some minorities, particularly along the Burma border, with long traditions of independence and anti-Chinese attitudes, still hinder total political consolidation of the Southwest.
Plowing in Kweichow Province. A green manure crop is being plowed under in the preparation of the field for rice. Kweichow, traditionally one of the poorest and most backward provinces in China, is mostly hilly and mountainous with only isolated and scattered small basins suited for agriculture.

Cotton drying in Szechwan. This province produces 90 percent of the cotton grown in Southwest China. Most of the crop is raised in the northwest portion of the Szechwan Basin, and many of the cotton textile mills are located in Ch'eng-tu.

Terracing in the Szechwan Basin. Most of the Szechwan Basin is hilly, but fertile and easily tilled soils throughout the lowlands and on the slopes, a near-year-round growing season, and usually adequate precipitation make this one of China’s most productive agricultural regions.

A section of the Pao-cheng railroad between Pao-chi and Ch'eng-tu. The railroad traverses the rugged western extensions of the Ta-shing and Ta-pa ranges. The completion of the line in 1956 ended the isolation of Szechwan and opened the Szechwan Basin to economic exploitation.
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Sinkiang

Sinkiang is a vast region of deserts and high mountains, lightly populated and largely undeveloped. Mountains rim the province on three sides, and the west-to-east trending ranges of the Tien Shan separate the two major physical regions—the Dzungarian Basin, with its deserts and steppe lands to the north, and the larger and more arid Tarim Basin in the south. Sinkiang occupies a pivotal position in Central Asia, and it shares an 1,800-mile-long boundary with the Soviet Union. The Chinese have throughout history tried, by direct or indirect means, to prevent the region from falling into potentially hostile hands by controlling key areas and routes within it.

Perhaps in no other part of China is the overworked expression, "land of extremes and paradoxes," more appropriate than in Sinkiang. In area the province comprises one-sixth of China, but in population it accounts for barely one percent of the total. Temperatures may reach 130°F in the Turfan Depression, while on the steppes of Dzungaria, lows of -40°F have been recorded. Sinkiang contains China's lowest and driest areas: the Turfan Depression is 505 feet below sea level; and at Charkhlik (Jo-ch'iong) in the southern Tarim Basin, the annual precipitation averages only one-fifth of an inch. Sinkiang's yearly precipitation is inadequate for agriculture, yet some of its oasis agricultural products—Ho-mi melons and Turfon seedless grapes and dried fruits—are renowned throughout China. Although Sinkiang is physically isolated by mountains, deserts, and sheer distance, routes crossing it served for centuries as the major means of contact with the rest of the world.

The Tarim Basin is Sinkiang's most striking physical feature. Sharply defined by encircling mountains, it comprises just over half of the provincial area. It is almost devoid of vegetation. The bare, shifting sands of the Takla Makan Desert and the salt wastes of Lop Nor account for over one-third of its area. Ribbons of poplars, willows, and often lush undergrowth along the water courses give way to drought- and salt-resistant grass and scrub as the streams thin and disappear into the desert sands. Dry river channels are marked by dead forests and cone-shaped mounds of sand, formed and held in place by dead tamarisk bushes. Nevertheless, life exists along the channels of the Yarkand-Tarim River that winds across the western and northern rim of the Basin and at the base of the encircling mountains where streams spill out in fan-shaped form to create oases of great fertility. Dependable supplies of water in these oases are obtained from streams that are fed by snowmelt in the high mountains.

The Tarim oases are populated primarily by Uighurs, people of Turkic stock. Over the centuries they have built intricate systems of canals and dug wells to supply water for fields in which various grains, fruit, vegetables, and cotton are grown. Agricultural areas have expanded in recent years, particularly along the Basin's northern margin, where a growing number of earthen dams on the Tarim River provide water for irrigation, drinking, and fish culture.

Northern Sinkiang, comprised principally of the Dzungarian Basin and the Tien Shan, has traditionally been an area inhabited by nomadic herdsmen. An average of 10 inches of precipitation annually, with somewhat higher amounts in the mountains, produces extensive grasslands that enable Kazakh, Mongol, and Kirghiz herdsmen to graze large numbers of sheep, cattle, and horses. Dry farming, with wheat and other grains predominating, is practiced in parts of the Dzungarian Basin. Extensive irrigated tracts also are prominent. The Ma-ras-su (Manas) River, which flows northward from the Tien Shan into the Basin, is the site of a major irrigation scheme that provides water for the cultivation of wheat, cotton, sugar beets, and rice.

Important oil discoveries have been made at Karamai and Tu-shan-tzu in the Dzungarian Basin. The economic base also has been enlarged through the construction of a number of manufacturing plants, mostly in and near Urumchi. Included in the industrial complex are an iron and steel works and factories producing cement, farm machinery, fertilizers, and textiles. In addition there are tanneries, rendering plants, and fruit- and vegetable canning centers. A number of mines of local importance also have been opened.

The oases located both north and south of the ancient Silk Route were stopping points for travelers of the ancient Silk Route that led from China through Central Asia and eventually to Europe. The alignments of the Silk Route remain today as a major segment of southern Sinkiang's roadnet, improved in places by grading and gravel, but in many places poorly maintained and ill defined. A number of new roads, however, have been built, particularly those providing access to sensitive and strategic frontier areas—most notably in northern Sinkiang adjacent to the Soviet frontier. A significant transportation development was the completion of the Trans-Sinkiang Railroad to Urumchi in the early 1960's, which finally connected Sinkiang by rail to the rest of China. Although originally scheduled to extend west and connect with the Soviet rail system at Druzhba at the border, the linkup has not been completed because of the dispute between the two great powers.

Since 1953, and particularly since 1960, Peking has sent massive numbers of Han Chinese, both workers and party cadres, to Sinkiang to help develop the province. Many have been placed in the Production and Construction Corps, a paramilitary organization now under the People's Liberation Army, which is assigned major land reclamation and water conservancy projects. The influx of Han Chinese has drastically altered the traditional population balance of the region, in which the Uighurs and other non-Han Chinese groups far outnumbered the Han. Of the 8 to 10 million people in Sinkiang today, perhaps as many as two-fifths are Han Chinese.
A pass (elevation 15,600 feet) in the barren Kunlun Mountains along Sinkiang's southern border. Melt water derived from the snow-capped summits feeds this meandering stream, a tributary of the Yarkand river. The Yarkand is being increasingly used for irrigation before emptying into Lop Nor, 1000 miles away.

A Chinese geological survey party in the Takla Makan Desert. This team of geologists is using the most efficient form of surface transport for such terrain. A northeast wind constantly shifts the sand, forming it into classic examples of ripple and crescent-shaped dunes.

A vineyard in the Turfan Oasis, southeast of Urumchi. Raisin-curing flues are on the slopes in the background. Many kinds of fruit and long staple cotton thrive in this area of arid conditions, high temperatures, and long growing season.

Kazakh herdsmen grazing their flocks. The scene is in the Altai Mountains near the Mongolian border where precipitation is sufficient to support luxuriant grasslands and occasional stands of coniferous forests.

Members of the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps clear land in the Tarim Basin preparatory to planting. The dead trees and undergrowth being removed are the remains of a dense poplar-willow-tamarisk jungle that once flourished along the banks of a now dry stream channel. Live trees and bushes in the background indicate an active watercourse.
The Tibetan Highlands, containing more than one-fourth the area of China but less than one percent of the population, is the highest and most extensive plateau on earth. It is the mother of many rivers: its eastern slopes are the sources of the Huang Ho, Yangtze, Mekong and Salween; along its southern edge are the sources of the Indus, Sutlej, and Brahmaputra (Tsang po). Rimmed by even higher mountain ranges, this region's physical seclusion has produced a unique civilization relatively unchanged by outside forces until the Chinese occupation in 1951. The region is the homeland of the Tibetan peoples, who ethnically predominate almost everywhere in the Highlands, parts of which are now incorporated into the provinces of Tsinghai, Szechwan, and Yunnan. The southern half of the region, designated as the Tibetan Autonomous Region by the Chinese, coincides territorially with the former extent of the political entity of Tibet. This vast region traditionally was held together by three unifying influences: a form of Buddhism administered from Lhasa through numerous powerful monasteries; a common written form of the various dialects of the Tibetan language; and the propensity of Tibetans to be traders.

The Highlands comprise three natural divisions: the Ch'iong-t'ong (north plain); the populous cultivated valleys of the south and southeast; and a large peripheral area in the east and southeast. The arid, wind-swept Ch'iong-t'ong—bounded by the Kunlun, Karakoram, and Kailas mountain ranges and by the high grasslands of Tsinghai—is a gigantic basin of internal drainage; its surface, almost everywhere 3 miles high, is a complex of mountain ranges, broad valleys, and plains that are liberally strewn with lakes varying in degree of salinity. Life is sustained by meager precipitation permit a limited amount of agriculture. The Tsangpo Valley, together with its tributary valleys, is the heartland of Tibet. Over the centuries it was the focus of ancient trade routes from India, China, and Central Asia. Lhasa, the capital, formerly was also the residence of the Dalai Lama, who headed the religious-civil government in Tibet. Until recently, farmers, traders, and monks inhabited the cultivated valleys, while nomads roamed the surrounding grasslands at higher elevations. Under the Chinese, trade has been sharply curtailed and the monks have fled or been eliminated. The major centers of population other than Lhasa are Jih-k'o-tse and Chiang-tzu, southwest of Lhasa, Ch'ang-tu in the Mekong Valley of eastern Tibet, and the new Chinese-built town of Lin-chih, located in southeastern Tibet. Chinese military and administrative personnel are stationed in these key areas, where small-scale industrialization and the expansion of cultivated areas are being undertaken on a very limited basis.

The third natural division of the Tibetan Highlands consists of the old Tibetan districts of Amdo, now the province of Tsinghai, and Kham, now western Szechwan and northwestern Yunnan—traditionally a region of petty kingdoms and grasslands controlled by unruly nomadic peoples. Most of Tsinghai is grassland, and it has a large nomadic population—mainly in the southeast. But in western Szechwan and northern Yunnan, an area of rugged mountain ranges, separated by deep valleys and narrow canyons, there is little grazing land and few upland valleys that are suitable for agriculture. The people here (Khambas) are fierce, brigandish warriors, who stoutly resisted the Chinese invasion and were instrumental in preventing Chinese control of the area until 1959.

Except for industrial development around Hsi-nung in northeastern Tsinghai and oil exploitation in the Ta sadam Basin, the Chinese have expended their greatest effort on the construction and maintenance of access roads to Lhasa and the other key areas of southern Tibet. This was particularly difficult through Szechwan where roads had to be built "against the grain" of the mountain ranges.

The Tibetan Highlands, because of their remoteness and difficult access, have yielded limited economic returns to China for the amount of resources invested. Although the Tibetan Highlands are politically more firmly integrated with China than at any other time in history, central and administration of this region have been difficult to achieve and occasional acts of Tibetan resistance still are recorded.
Ganden Monastery near Lhasa. This monastery, one of the largest and most important in Tibet, was gutted and its contents destroyed by the Chinese as an aftermath of the 1959 revolt. It is now used as the central granary for storing grain from all parts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. All of the monasteries, except a few preserved as "show places," have suffered similar treatment by the Chinese in their attempt to eradicate religion in Tibet. The buildings are rarely destroyed, however, because they are useful for offices, barracks, prisons, or storage.

Valley west of Lhasa. The stacked grain is barley, the principal grain crop in Tibet. Ground and mixed with butter and tea, it becomes tsampa, the staple of the Tibetan diet. Although the Chinese have instituted a few experimental farms, agriculture continues in the old patterns. Here Chinese plows and dzo (a yak-cattle hybrid), traditional draft animals of Tibet, are being used. Grain is still winnowed by hand, as indicated by the cloud of chaff in background.

Tibetan nomad camp near Na-ch'i on the high plateau north of Lhasa. Nomads have only one variety of sheep; they are longer legged and have coarser wool than other varieties of Tibetan sheep found at lower elevations. These pastureage sheep are used both for wool and as pack animals; they can carry a 30-pound load for great distances. Salt from the old lake beds on the Ch'ang-t'ang is transported down to trading centers where the sheep are unloaded and sheared and the salt and wool are bartered.

The town of Lin-chih in southeastern Tibet. The tributary valley of the Tsangpo in which it is located is below 10,000 feet and receives considerable rainfall. Slopes are covered with shrubs and trees, most of which are suitable for timber. The valley is among the most productive in Tibet, and along with similar valleys to the east, has a physical environment that is more hospitable for the Han Chinese than are the higher, drier, and more barren parts of Tibet.

Valley south of Tse-tang. This valley, one of the many tributary valleys of the Tsangpo, is typical of the cultivated valleys of southern Tibet. The slopes here are more barren of vegetation than those in southeastern Tibet, but the valley floors are equally as fertile. The tree clusters, some of which are fruit trees, mark the location of houses and monasteries. Barley, and maize, along with hardy vegetables, are grown.
Administrative Divisions

The administrative structure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established by the Constitution adopted at the First National People’s Congress in September 1954. The accompanying table, Administrative Divisions, lists the number of administrative subdivisions, at various levels, within the 21 provinces, the five autonomous regions, and the three municipalities directly under Central Government control.

Administrative Changes (1949-58)—The political structure inherited by the PRC in 1949 had experienced considerable stress during the preceding decades of civil unrest, warlordism, foreign occupation, and civil war. In many remote frontier provinces, local administration had even supplanted national control. The country then consisted of 35 provinces, including Tibet but excluding Taiwan. Between 1949 and 1958 considerable reorganization of the provincial structure occurred, involving mainly the abolition of provinces—principally in the Northeast—and the incorporation of their territory into adjacent provinces. Numerous but minor readjustments of provincial boundaries were also made during this time period.

Autonomous Administrative Units—Nearly 60 percent of China is inhabited by various non-Han Chinese ethnolinguistic groups, and the provinces in which they predominate have been redesignated as “autonomous regions.” Autonomy, as conceived by the PRC, is not outside the Chinese tradition. Essentially it involves symbolic cultural indulgence of local minorities, along with the appointment of local people who are sufficiently reliable to assure effective administration of Peking’s policies. Autonomous regions were established in Inner Mongolia, Kiangsi, Sinkiang, and Ningsia between 1947 and 1958. Tibet did not gain full-fledged status as an autonomous region until 1965, when its rebellious people were finally judged to be sufficiently under Chinese control to permit such a step. In the five autonomous regions, the non-Chinese peoples outnumber the Han only in Tibet and Sinkiang. An autonomous structure at subprovincial and lower administrative levels also occurs in some parts of other provinces inhabited by sizable numbers of non-Chinese peoples.

Administrative Changes (1959-71)—During the last decade, the first-order administrative structure has remained comparatively stable. The number of administrative units directly under central control has been increased by one, some provincial boundaries have been realigned, and a provincial capital has been relocated.

During 1969 a series of administrative changes appeared to be taking place in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). Several special district-level units (meng) in the east were apparently taken from IMAR and subordinated to Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning provinces. About two-thirds of western IMAR was detached, part being assigned to Kansu and part subordinated to the Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region. There has been neither a formal publication of these boundary changes nor an official pronouncement concerning the administrative structure of the area retained as IMAR. These changes were apparently motivated by heightened tensions and border incidents along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 and by the consequent need for a simplified and centrally controlled military defense system opposite the sensitive and strategic border with Mongolia and the USSR. Aside from the military implications, the shifting of subprovincial units to adjacent provinces has probably simplified administration and tightened political control.

At lower administrative levels changes have been more numerous and frequent, particularly in the wake of the administrative confusion caused by the creation of communes after 1958. The administrative organization was further upset and possibly modified by the Cultural Revolution (1966-69).

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### Administrative Divisions

**Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Region</th>
<th>Special District</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Autonomous Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsien, Information unavailable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative Divisions**

**Province Level** (First Order)

- Anhwei: 9 Special Districts, 6 Counties
- Chikiang: 8 Special Districts, 7 Counties
- Fukien: 7 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Heilungkiang: 6 Special Districts, 8 Counties
- Hopeh: 10 Special Districts, 10 Counties
- Hsien: 10 Special Districts, 10 Counties
- Hupat: 8 Special Districts, 8 Counties
- Kansu: 2 Special Districts, 2 Counties
- Kiangsu: 6 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Kiangsi: 5 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Kirin: 5 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Kwangtung: 8 Special Districts, 4 Counties
- Kiangsu Chuang: 8 Special Districts, 4 Counties
- Inner Mongolia: 7 Special Districts, 7 Counties
- Kansu Chuang: 5 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Sinkiang Uighur: 5 Special Districts, 5 Counties
- Tibet: 5 Special Districts, 5 Counties

**Subprovince Level** (Intermediate)

- Anhwei: 9 Subprovinces
- Chikiang: 8 Subprovinces
- Fukien: 7 Subprovinces
- Heilungkiang: 6 Subprovinces
- Hopeh: 10 Subprovinces
- Hsien: 10 Subprovinces
- Hupat: 8 Subprovinces
- Kansu: 2 Subprovinces
- Kiangsu: 6 Subprovinces
- Kiangsi: 5 Subprovinces
- Kirin: 5 Subprovinces
- Kwangtung: 8 Subprovinces
- Kiangsu Chuang: 8 Subprovinces
- Inner Mongolia: 7 Subprovinces
- Kansu Chuang: 5 Subprovinces
- Sinkiang Uighur: 5 Subprovinces
- Tibet: 5 Subprovinces

**County Level** (Second Order)

- Anhwei: 9 Counties
- Chikiang: 8 Counties
- Fukien: 7 Counties
- Heilungkiang: 6 Counties
- Hopeh: 10 Counties
- Hsien: 10 Counties
- Hupat: 8 Counties
- Kansu: 2 Counties
- Kiangsu: 5 Counties
- Kiangsi: 4 Counties
- Kirin: 4 Counties
- Kwangtung: 4 Counties
- Kiangsu Chuang: 4 Counties
- Inner Mongolia: 3 Counties
- Kansu Chuang: 3 Counties
- Sinkiang Uighur: 3 Counties
- Tibet: 3 Counties

**Subprovince**

- Inner Mongolia: 7 Subprovinces
- Kansu Chuang: 5 Subprovinces
- Sinkiang Uighur: 5 Subprovinces
- Tibet: 5 Subprovinces

**City Level**

- Shanghai: 6 Municipalities, 1 Special District
- Peking: 9 Municipalities, 1 Special District
- Taipei: 8 Municipalities, 1 Special District
- Tientsin: 6 Municipalities, 1 Special District
- Yunnan: 8 Municipalities

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Administrative Changes (1959-71)—During the last decade, the first-order administrative structure has remained comparatively stable. The number of administrative units directly under central control has been increased by one, some provincial boundaries have been realigned, and a provincial capital has been relocated.

The addition of one first-order administrative unit, directly under central control, occurred with the re-elevation in 1967 of Tientsin (T'ien-chin) to a province-level municipality on a par with Peking and Shanghai. No official announcement giving the date of this action is known. Concurrent with the elevation of Tientsin to its new status was the relocation of the Hopeh Province capital from Tientsin to Shih-chia-chuang, some 160 miles southwest of Peking.

During 1969 a series of administrative changes appear to have occurred in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). Several special district-level units (meng) in the east were apparently taken from IMAR and subordinated to Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning provinces. About two-thirds of western IMAR was detached, part being assigned to Kansu and part subordinated to the Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region. There has been neither a formal publication of these boundary changes nor an official pronouncement concerning the administrative structure of the area retained as IMAR. These changes were apparently motivated by heightened tensions and border incidents along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 and by the consequent need for a simplified and centrally controlled military defense system opposite the sensitive and strategic border with Mongolia and the USSR. Aside from the military implications, the shifting of subprovincial units to adjacent provinces has probably simplified administration and tightened political control.

At lower administrative levels changes have been more numerous and frequent, particularly in the wake of the administrative confusion caused by the creation of communes after 1958. The administrative organization was further upset and possibly modified by the Cultural Revolution (1966-69).
### Guide to Pronunciation of Major Administrative Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Wade-Giles Romanization</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>An-hui</td>
<td>ahn-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>Che-chiang</td>
<td>jee-chiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>Fu-chien</td>
<td>foo-chyen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Hei-lung-chiang</td>
<td>hay-lyung-chiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>Ho-nan</td>
<td>hoo-nnon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeh</td>
<td>Ho-pei</td>
<td>hoo-bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Hu-nan</td>
<td>hoo-bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupheh</td>
<td>Hu-pei</td>
<td>hoo-bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Nei-meng-ku</td>
<td>nay-mung-goo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>K'an-su</td>
<td>gahn-soo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsai</td>
<td>Chiang-hsi</td>
<td>je-kee-she</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>Chang-su</td>
<td>je-kee-lynn</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kirin</td>
<td>Chi-lin</td>
<td>g-wong-she</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangsai</td>
<td>Kiang-hsi</td>
<td>g-wong-dong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>Kuang-tung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>Kwei-chou</td>
<td>g-way-joe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Lia-ning</td>
<td>lee-ning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>Ning-hsia</td>
<td>ninghsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking</td>
<td>Pei-ching</td>
<td>bay-jing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Shan-hai</td>
<td>shahn-she</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>Shan-tung</td>
<td>shahn-dong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>Shen-hsi</td>
<td>shun-she</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>Sin-chang</td>
<td>shin-jee-ong</td>
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<td>Ssu-ch'uan</td>
<td>ssu-chwan</td>
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<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Hsi-t'ang</td>
<td>she-dzong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tientsin</td>
<td>Tien-chin</td>
<td>te-en-jeen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tsinghai</td>
<td>Ch'ing-hai</td>
<td>ching-hi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Yun-nan</td>
<td>yoon-non</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese place names may take on picturesque qualities when rendered in literal translation. This view of China from the east suggests the geographic origins of many of the ancient province names. Geographic features frequently comprising elements of place names include: *pei* - north, *nan* - south, *tung* - east, *hsi* - west, *ho* and *chiang* - river, *hu* - lake, and *shan* - mountain.
Administrative Divisions

- Province-level boundary
- Subprovince-level boundary
- Shih (municipality)
- Chuan-ch'ii (special district)
- Tzu-chih-chou (autonomous district)
- Hsing-cheng-ch'ii (administrative district)
- Meng (league)
- Area under direct province-level administration

NOTE: In 1969, four Meng of the Inner Mongol Autonomous Region were transferred, in whole or in part, to adjoining provinces. Their names or type of administrative unit are not known.

Limits of Hsiang, Chia-mu-ssu, Shuang-yo-shan, Chi-hsi, and Mu-shung Municipalities in Hopeh and Shih-chia-chuang Municipalities in Hopeh are not known.

Scale: 1:10,000,000

0 100 200 300 400 500 Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometers

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.
Population

Nearly one-fourth of the people of the world live in the People's Republic of China. The number is speculative because official population data have not been announced for more than a decade. Estimates of the total population, therefore, vary widely—from approximately 750 million to nearly 900 million—and reflect alternative projections from the 583 million people officially reported by the 1953 census.

Population density varies strikingly, with the greatest contrasts being between the eastern and western halves of the country. The high mountains, plateaus, and arid basins of the Tibetan Highlands and the Sinkiang-Mongolia Region comprise slightly more than 50 percent of the area of China, but this vast territory contains only about 5 percent of the total population, and large areas are uninhabited. Sharply contrasting are small nodes of comparatively high population density in oases areas where dependable amounts of water are present.

In the eastern half of China population densities generally range upward from 130 per square mile. Major areas in which the population density is in excess of 520 persons per square mile coincide with level-to-rolling alluvial plains on which intensive agriculture is centered. A major exception is the moderately hilly Szechwan Basin; it contains little level land, but extensive terracing and a long growing season permit high rural population densities. Areas of lower population density in the eastern part of China usually denote marginal or nonagricultural land.

Urban areas with populations in excess of 50,000 are classified by size on the map, and a few selected cities with fewer than 50,000 people are shown—principally in western China. An accurate classification of all urban areas is not possible because of the lack of data and the very rapid growth of many Chinese cities during the past decade or so. Approximately 90 percent of the 216 urban centers with populations of 50,000 or more are located in eastern China; of the 16 cities with populations exceeding 1 million, only Canton is located south of the Yangtze River. This pattern results in part from the longer period of Han Chinese settlement and the political and economic primacy of the Yangtze Valley and the North China Plain. In contrast, most of the provinces of South China have been more recently settled (in the long view of Chinese history), and they possess fewer and more dispersed natural resources sizable enough to support large urban agglomerations.

Five cities in Northeast China have a population of 1 million or more—Shen-yang, Ch'ang-ch'un, Fu-shun, Ha-erh-pin, and Lu-ta—reflecting the development of this region as China's first major base of heavy industry. To the northwest, the cities of Sian and T'ai-yuan, each with over 1 million population, have experienced very rapid growth during the past 15 years, benefiting from Chinese policies to develop and expand industrial bases in the interior provinces. Lan-chau, which probably has almost 1 million people, has also shared in the great industrial expansion of this region. Other urban concentrations include the large number of cities located on the North China Plain and the string of Yangtze River ports and cities located nearby on navigable tributaries.
Sixteen Most Populous Cities

U.S.

1. New York 7,867,760
2. Chicago 3,366,957
3. Los Angeles 2,816,061
4. Philadelphia 1,948,609
5. Detroit 1,511,482
6. Houston 1,232,802
7. Baltimore 905,759
8. Dallas 844,401
10. Cleveland 744,624
11. San Francisco 717,099
12. San Diego 715,674
13. San Antonio 696,769
14. Boston 654,153
15. Cleveland 641,071

China

1. Shanghai 6,900,000
2. Peking 4,010,000
3. Tientsin 3,220,000
4. Shen-yang 2,411,000
5. Wu-han 2,146,000
6. Ch'ung-ch'ing 2,121,000
7. Canton 1,840,000
8. Ha-erh-pin 1,552,000
9. Lu-ta 1,508,000
10. Nan-ching 1,419,000
11. Sian 1,310,000
12. Tsingtao 1,121,000
13. Ch'eng-tu 1,107,000
14. Tai-yuan 1,020,000
15. Fu-shun 1,000,000
16. Ch'ang-ch'un 1,000,000

b. Official 1957 estimates based on 1953 Census. Many cities have grown very rapidly in the last decade and current populations may be considerably higher than the figures shown.

Area and Population (1957)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent of National Total</th>
<th>Thousands</th>
<th>Percent of National Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>272,300</td>
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<td>Kirin</td>
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<td>648,600</td>
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* The table is dated upon 1957 estimates, the last official information available. Adjustments have been made to reflect post-1957 territorial-administrative changes.
Population

RURAL POPULATION
Persons per square mile

URBAN POPULATION
- Over 3,000,000
- 1,000,000-3,000,000
- 500,000-1,000,000
- Under 50,000 (selected)
Ethnolinguistic Groups

Almost all inhabitants of mainland China are of Mongoloid stock, and ethnic distinctions in the country are largely linguistic rather than racial. The Han comprise nearly 95 percent of the population, the remaining 5 percent, consisting of approximately 50 groups, are termed "minority nationalities" by Peking. Although non-Han peoples are relatively few in number, they are politically significant; most inhabit strategic frontier territory, and some have religious or ethnic ties with groups in adjoining nations. The traditional preponderance of non-Han groups in western China, however, is lessening because Han Chinese have entered these remote regions in increasing numbers since 1950.

Major Language Families—Four major language families are represented in China—the Sino-Tibetan, Altaic, Indo-European, and Austrasian. The Sino-Tibetan family is numerically and areally the most important, and within it the several languages and dialects of Chinese predominate. Although unified by tradition, written language, and many cultural traits, the Han Chinese speak several mutually unintelligible tongues. Most Han Chinese use the northern dialect, or one of its variants, commonly called Mandarin; a national vernacular based on this dialect has been popularized. Several different Chinese languages are spoken south of the Yangtze. They include Wu, Hsiang, Kan, Min, Cantonesine, and Hakka, each of which is used by several million persons, with lesser numbers speaking other local languages and dialects.

Tibeto-Burman Groups—Politically the most potent of the several Sino-Tibetan language groups, aside from the Han Chinese, are the Tibeto-Burman-speaking people who inhabit much of the rough mountainous country of western and southwestern China. The Tibetans, inhabiting a vast sweep of territory from Kansu and Szechwan westward to Kashmir, are the most important group. Totaling only about 3 million, they have retained their cultural identity and political unity largely through the bond of Lamaism—the Tibetan variant of Buddhism. The former ecclesiastical power base provided by Lamaism, at whose apex was the Dalai Lama, has been greatly reduced and weakened since suppression of the 1959 Tibetan revolt. The three dialects spoken in Tibet—western, central, and eastern—are mutually intelligible.

The Hui, or Chinese Muslims, number about 3 million and are intermingled with the Han throughout much of China. Their heaviest concentration is in the Northwest, particularly in the Ninghsia Hui Autonomous Region and in Kansu, where nearly one-third of the Hui reside. Although the Hui speak Mandarin or regional Chinese languages and use Chinese characters, they generally live in separate communities and their history is marked by uprisings against the Han. The other Tibeto-Burman-speaking groups are divided into hill people—whose way of life is characterized by a subsistence economy based upon varying mixtures of agriculture, animal husbandry, and hunting—and lowland people such as the several Tai-speaking groups. Of the hill groups, the Yi (Lolo) are the most numerous. Those living in the mountains of southern Szechwan between the Yangtze and its tributary, the Ya-lung Chiang, share with the Tibetans a cultural identity and a tradition of independence marked by frequent conflict with the Han Chinese. Two sizable Tibeto-Burman-speaking groups—the Pai (Min-chia) and Tuchia—are valley dwellers engaged in wet-rice agriculture.

Miao-Yao—The Miao-Yao group of the Sino-Tibetan family is widely scattered throughout the mountains of South and Southwest China; a number also live in northern Southeast Asia. Although the Miao and Yao exhibit some cultural variations, in general they are upland dwellers. Their traditional slash-and-burn agriculture reportedly has been curbed, and more stable and intensive agricultural practices have been promoted. In spite of a history of suppression and dispersal throughout Southwest China, the Miao have retained independent ways that are marked by initiative and adaptability to changing physical and political conditions.

Tai—Tai-speaking peoples comprise the fourth major group of the Sino-Tibetan family. They appear to be differentiated by minor linguistic dissimilarities—although Tai dialects reportedly are mutually intelligible—and partly by locational and minor cultural variations. The largest group is the Chuang, who total nearly 7 million and inhabit western Kwangsi. Unlike many hill-dwelling groups, most Tai groups have been strongly influenced by Chinese culture, although some retain Tai-influenced lowlands and their economy is based upon growing irrigated rice.

Altaic Family—People of the Altaic language family are widely dispersed from the forests of Northeast China to the basins of Sinkiang. They include the Mongols, several Tungusic groups in Northeast China, and the Turkic groups in Sinkiang’s oases and grasslands.

The Mongols are the most widely dispersed of the Altaic language speakers, and several dialects are recognized. Most of the Mongol population live in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, but small Mongol and Mongol-related groups are scattered from Sinkiang through Tsinhai and into the provinces of the Northeast. Some retain their tribal divisions and are pastoralists, but most now live in permanent settlements and are engaged in a mixed crop and livestock economy.

Turkic Groups—Turkic-speaking groups predominate in Sinkiang and are scattered in Tsinhai and Kansu. The productive oases of Sinkiang have felt the impress of different peoples and cultures from ancient times; consequently the racial, linguistic, and cultural origins of the present-day inhabitants are blurred and complex. The Uighurs are the most numerous of the Turkic speakers, numbering about 5 million, they predominate in the oases of southern Sinkiang where they comprise an estimated 90 percent of the population. The Kazakhs, who rank second in number, inhabit areas adjacent to the USSR and Mongolian borders. The third largest group is the Kirghiz, high mountain pastoralists inhabiting southwestern Sinkiang. Other smaller Turkic-speaking groups occupy valleys of the Tien Shan and the oases and grasslands of northern Sinkiang.

Other Altaic Groups—Other members of the Altaic language family include such Tungusic groups as the seminomadic Evenki and Orochon, the Sibos, and the Manchus. The Evenki, Orochon, and Sibos together number only a few thousand. Although the 1953 Chinese census recognized the Manchus as a separate nationality and enumerated some 2.4 million of them, they appear to have been almost entirely assimilated by the Han Chinese and therefore are not separately identified on the map. Slightly more than 1 million Koreans live in China, primarily in Kirin Province adjacent to the North Korean border. The exact affinities of the Korean language are unclear, but because of strong structural similarities it is included with the Altaic family.

Indo-European and Austrasian Families—The Indo-European and Austrasian language families are both represented by relatively insignificant numbers; representatives of these language families live in southwestern Sinkiang and in Yunnan. The Kawa, a Mon-Khmer-speaking group, inhabit the rugged mountain country of the Burma-China border. The Indo-European family is represented by the Tedzhiaks who live in the valleys and surrounding uplands of southwestern Sinkiang.
Linguistic Groups

**SINO-TIBETAN**
- Mandarin
  1. Northern
  2. Eastern
  3. Southwestern
- Southern dialects
  1. Wu
  2. Kun
  3. Yue
  4. Min
  5. Hokkian
  6. Hakka
- Tibetan
  1. Western
  2. Central
  3. Eastern
- Tai
- Miao-Yao

**INDO-EUROPEAN**
- Tadzhik
- AUSTROASIATIC
- Mon-Khmer

**ALTAIC**
- Turkic
  1. Kazakh
  2. Uighur
  3. Kirghiz
- Mongolian
  1. Western (Torgut)
  2. Western (Khoshol)
  3. Western (<Oirat)
  4. Southern (Ordor)
  5. Southern (Chabas)
  6. Eastern (Khalkha)

**ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS**

Ethnic Groups

- Han (Chinese)
- Hui (Chinese Muslim)
- Tibetans
- Tai
- Miao-Yao

**ALTAIC**
- Turkic
- Mongolian

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Ethnolinguistic Groups

A group of Tibetans. The dress and articles shown in this recent (and posed) photograph are those of the Tibetan middle class prior to the Chinese occupation. Intended to show daily life in Tibet today, the group pictured is probably more typical of a prosperous family on a picnic.

A village s inhabitants are dominated by Uighurs. Three roofs have intense sun.
Khotan (Ho-t'ien). In­
nkiang oases are pre­
ric stock, and most are
vines adjoining flat-
de shade from the

Mongol encampment. This traditional form
of Mongol life - portable yurts, camels,
and accompanying herds - is rapidly
passing. Most Mongol families now live
in permanent quarters, have tied pastures,
and grow vegetables, fodder crops, and grain.

Hill tribe village in Yunnan Province.
Numerous Tibeto-Burman speaking groups
in Southwest China live in widely scat­
tered and isolated mountain villages.
Their traditional way of life, commonly
based on shifting agriculture, is giving
way to a more stabilized economic sys­
tem that often involves growing irrigat-
ed rice.

Han Chinese students and teachers in
study session. Educational policies em­
phasize the combination of formal edu­
cation and practical working experience
on farms and in factories.

T'ai village in Yunnan Province. The T'ai,
one of the more numerous minorities in
Southwest China, live almost exclusively
in Yunnan Province. They inhabit isolated
areas where they grow wet rice and tropical
fruits. T'ai villages are generally isolated
beside flowing water, and the houses are
surrounded by bamboo fences.

ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS
Railroads

Railroads are the principal component of China's transportation system. Despite many difficulties, China has added more than 11,000 miles of main and branch lines to the railroad system since 1950, thereby greatly improving the integrity and flexibility of the 25,000-mile rail network as of early 1971. Every province and region except Tibet is connected to the railroad network by at least one main line. China has 11 international rail connections (5 with North Korea, 2 each with the USSR and North Vietnam, and 1 each with Mongolia and Hong Kong). The Chinese have made efforts to improve the railroad system in order to solidify central government control, to disperse the industrial base, and to provide more efficient logistical support to the military. In furthering these goals they not only have built new lines, but also have increased the number of industrial spurs and have expanded numerous railroad yards.

Repair and Rehabilitation (1949-52)—The railroad network inherited by the Chinese Communists in 1949 was badly damaged, poorly distributed, disconnected, and heavily oriented toward North and Northeast China. Much of China south of the Yangtze and all of western China were without rail lines. The principal construction effort initially was directed toward restoration, and more than half of all the track laid during the period 1949-52 was for this purpose. During this period emphasis also was placed on the completion or extension of three new lines started by the Nationalists: (1) extension of the major east-west line between T'ien-shui and Lan-chou; (2) completion of the line between Ch'eng-tu and Ch'ung-ch'ing in the Szechwan Basin, and (3) extension of a line southward from near Li-f'ang to the border of Vietnam, primarily for the purpose of supporting the Vietnamese Communists in their war against the French.

Expansion of the Rail Network (1953-60)—Once the basic repair and rehabilitation work had been completed, the Chinese shifted their emphasis to expanding the basic network. The travel distance between Moscow and Peking was shortened by 700 miles in 1954 with the completion of a railroad across Mongolia. During the 1950's steady progress also was made on the Trans-Sinkiang line that led west from Lan-chou and was designed to link with the Soviet rail net at the border; however, the line has not been extended beyond Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang. Both these lines had high economic and strategic priorities. In 1955 military considerations were evident in the rapid building of the line from Ying-t'an to Amoy on the Fukien coast opposite Taiwan and other Nationalist-held islands. Two important lines linking key areas in China were opened to traffic in 1956 and 1958, respectively: (1) the Pao-chi-Ch'eng-tu line, traversing very rugged mountainous terrain and affording a rail connection between North China and the Szechwan Basin, and (2) the Pao-T'ou-Lan-chou line, connecting two developing economic centers in the interior.

Post-1960 Development—The collapse of the Leap Forward in 1960 significantly curtailed further expansion of the rail system for several years. Construction activity revived in the mid-1960's when the Chinese began preparations for a Third Five-Year Plan (1966-70), but this revival was interrupted in 1967-68 by the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution the Chinese again initiated long-term economic planning, and the scope and intensity of railroad construction increased significantly. Only a few major projects, however, were started during the 1960's. Much of the recent activity represents the continuation of work started in the 1950's.

Since 1964 railroad construction has focused primarily on southwest China. During the mid-1960's lines were completed to link Kweichow Province with both Yunnan and Szechwan provinces. A line linking Ch'eng-tu directly with K'un-ming in Yunnan Province was recently completed after more than a decade of construction activity. This new line provides a shorter and more direct access route to Yunnan Province from the Szechwan Basin and establishes the means for promoting the overall economic development of the southwestern region. Another major north-south line has been constructed roughly parallel to the Peking-Canton line as far south as the Yangtze river. This new line establishes an alternate route for heavy north-south traffic and opens up parts of Honan and Hupeh provinces for industrial development. Another important line is the Wu-han-Ch'ung-ch'ing line, presently under construction. When completed this line will provide the first direct rail route between the Szechwan Basin and the middle-Yangtze Basin.

The results of nearly 20 years of new railroad construction are considerable in terms of trackage added. Nevertheless, the regional distribution of the network, while improved, remains uneven. Although much remains to be done, the Chinese have made impressive progress toward achieving their goal of developing a modern, efficient railroad system to carry the increased traffic expected during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75).
The well-integrated railway system of the United States, constructed primarily between 1870-1910, reflects this country's advanced stage of economic development. The length of the US network, which presently is about 910,000 miles, has been slowly declining during recent decades.
Railroads

STANDARD GAUGE (4'8½"")
- Double track
- Single track
- Projected

BROAD GAUGE (5'6" in India, 5'9" in U.S.S.R. and Mongolia)
- Double track
- Single track
- Projected

NARROW GAUGE (various widths)
- Single track

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Roads and Inland Waterways

In China roads supplement other forms of transport, particularly the railroads, and provide short-haul, farm-to-market service. Direct through routes linking widely separated parts of the country are few, and there is no coordinated national highway system. Roads are of greatest relative significance in the west, where in many areas, as in Tibet, there may be no other means of transport.

China has more than 300,000 miles of road. More than one-half of this total consists of natural earth roads; the remainder are soil-aggregate roads (primarily gravel) along with a few thousand miles of bituminous-treated or concrete road. Most of the network is low-grade by Western standards and requires constant maintenance; on the other hand, traffic density is extremely light.

Expansion of the Road Network (1949-60)-In 1949 there were only some 50,000 miles of serviceable roads in the 124,000-mile highway network. At that time most major roads—approximately 75 percent of the total—were located in the eastern half of the country, particularly in the coastal areas and on the larger plains of the northern and northeastern provinces. From 1949 through 1952 emphasis was placed on the maintenance and restoration of the existing network, and only a limited amount of new construction—mostly highways of military significance in Liaoning, Shantung, and Fukien and on Hai-nan Tao—was completed. After 1952, major construction projects were begun in western and southwestern frontier provinces inhabited by large non-Chinese population groups. Several new roads in Kweilin and Yunnan were extended to the Indochina border, thus helping to provide logistical support for the Vietnamese Communists, then fighting the French. In recent years this part of the system has been further improved and enlarged. Between 1954 and 1956, major roads were completed to link the Szechwan Basin, eastern Tsinghai, and Sinkingh with Tibet and its capital at Lhasa. New roads also were built to permit the exploitation of the petroleum deposits of Karamai in western Sinkiang and of the Tsoonam Basin in western Tsinghai. The extensive road construction program in the remote western and southwestern provinces thus served several Chinese objectives: political control was greatly aided by improved communications; Chinese military capabilities (as demonstrated in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war) were greatly enhanced; and economic exploitation and development has been fostered.

Recent Developments—More recently, the Chinese constructed or improved numerous roads in the Sino-Soviet border area in the northeast and made a few additions to the road network in the northwest. Other new roads were constructed to the vicinity of the borders of Burma and Laos; one Chinese-constructed road extends into Laos to the town of Muong Sai. The Karakoram Highway, which connects Sinkiang Province with Pakistan through the Khunjerab Pass, was also recently completed.

Inland Waterways—Water transport was traditionally the major form of transportation in pre-1949 China. Much of its capacity was destroyed by war, however, and as a result, China's navigable waterways totaled only 46,000 miles in 1949. At that time a program of restoration and expansion was begun; locks were constructed, navigational facilities installed, and ports, harbors, and shipyards renovated. The completion of a number of large-scale water conservation projects, primarily for flood control, also contributed to the extension of the system. By 1938, China's navigable inland waterways had more than doubled in length, and at present they probably total more than 100,000 miles. Routes on streams suitable for modern motorized vessels total some 25,000 miles.

Regional Characteristics—Regionally, about 65 percent of the inland waterway network is located in South China, where the Yangtze and the Hsiang form the principal river basins, and about 30 percent is in North and Northeast China, where the Amur, Ussuri, Sungari, Huang, and Hsun are the principal rivers. The Amur and Ussuri rivers along the USSR border are also used by the Soviet Union. In the northeast, much of the network is closed to traffic for upwards of 180 days per year because of ice. The Huang Ho and most of the waterways in North China, including much of the Grand Canal, are of limited use as navigable waterways because of considerable silting and very low water during winter and spring.

Because the major rivers of China flow from west to east, north-south inland waterway traffic is limited. Some cargo, however, is moved on three of the southern tributaries of the Yangtze (the Yuan, Hsiang, and Kan Chiang), on the Han Shui north of the Yangtze, on the southern section of the Grand Canal, and on other minor waterways. The lack of usable north-south connections between the predominantly west-east oriented waterways and the obvious economic advantages that would result from an integrated system have been recognized by Chinese Communist planners. Long-range plans were drawn up in the early 1950's to interconnect the basins of the Amur, Huang, Yangtze, and Hsun rivers through the construction of new canals and the repair and improvement of existing waterways. Except for improvement of the southern half of the Grand Canal, however, little has been accomplished.

Importance of Waterways—Modern water transport is recognized by the Chinese to be important as a carrier of bulk cargo. The lack of usable north-south connections between the predominantly west-east oriented waterways and the obvious economic advantages that would result from an integrated system have been recognized by Chinese Communist planners. Long-range plans were drawn up in the early 1950's to interconnect the basins of the Amur, Huang, Yangtze, and Hsun rivers through the construction of new canals and the repair and improvement of existing waterways. Except for improvement of the southern half of the Grand Canal, however, little has been accomplished.

Primitive Transport—Vast amounts of cargo in China are moved by animal-drawn and manually drawn carts, carried by a variety of pack animals, or shouldered by humans. Distances involved in moving this cargo are short. Huge quantities of freight are also carried by sampans, junks, and similar small craft on the major waterways as well as on the innumerable small streams and canals.

A Chinese motorized sampan type of boat traveling on a river. Rubber-tired wheels on carts, a relatively recent innovation, reduce wear-and-tear on road surfaces and permit easy movement in fields.
A traditional means of transport—the carrying pole—still plays a very important role in the movement of vast amounts of material in China. Two baskets multiplied by millions of shoulders carry everything from fertilizer to vegetables.

Roads in Kweichow Province. Roads in low-lying areas are built on levees. This road is typical of those found in the principal plains and basins of eastern China.

Barges in the Yangtze Gorge upstream from Ich'ang. The Yangtze River is the major water transportation route to the interior of China. The Chinese have improved the river channel so that barges can now navigate the treacherous gorge area, as shown here, in comparative safety.

Army trucks on the Szechwan-Tibet road. This is a soil-aggregate type of construction, classified as a loose-surface, all-weather road. Constant maintenance, including snow removal, is required to keep this main access road to Tibet open to traffic.

Roads from Peking to the Great Wall, Hopeh Province. Only a few thousand miles of roads in China have high-grade surfaces such as the bituminous-treated surface here. Road surfaces vary from section to section; this road, for example, has a concrete surface in the vicinity of Peking, although concrete surfaces are rare in China. Near oil refineries, residual oils or tars are applied to harden or stabilize the surface.

Station on the Szechwan-Tibet road. This road, like most of the main roads in western China, stretches for hundreds of miles through sparsely inhabited areas. Rest, refueling, and supply stations, constructed about one day's drive apart, vary in size and services offered, and often accommodate road maintenance crews. The station shown here is one of the larger and more complex ones.

Roads in western China. Looping precipitous roads, such as this one, are common throughout the mountainous country of China. Road loops are often so numerous that road mileage is doubled or tripled compared to the "crow-fly" distance. Mountains in eastern China, although not as high as those shown here, often are as rugged and as troublesome for construction, maintenance, and transit.

Principal Improved Inland Waterways
Climate

The climate of China directly and often dramatically affects the lives of millions of its inhabitants. Each year the thin margin between agricultural production and population growth is threatened by too much or too little rainfall, unsuitable cold, and other climatic factors. No history of China is complete without reference to its floods and droughts, some of which were of great importance in sparking peasant discontent and rebellion.

General Climatic Patterns—The climate of most of China resembles that of the United States (excluding the Pacific coastal states) because of similar latitudinal locations, a comparable continental position, and general similarities in atmospheric circulation. Selected climatic data for representative cities occupying comparable locations in China and the United States are as follows:

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<th>Mean Temperature (°F) Jan.</th>
<th>Mean Temperature (°F) July</th>
<th>Mean Annual Precipitation (Inches)</th>
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<td>Canton</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>84</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>162</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, Chinese cities have lower winter temperatures, higher summer temperatures, and less precipitation than their United States counterparts. Rainfall in China is much more seasonal, being highly concentrated during the summer months. The principal reason for these differences arises from the greater size of Asia and the greater intensity of its air masses and their movement.

The most significant climatic division in China is between the semiarid-to-arid western regions and the humid eastern half of the country. An arbitrary line separating these two climatic divisions would extend northeast from the northern tip of Burma to a point where the Greater Khingan Range reaches the Amur river. South of the Yangtze river. South of the Yangtze the annual precipitation is at least 40 inches almost everywhere, and in some areas it is nearly double this amount.

Western China is isolated by high mountain barriers and by distance from significant sources of moisture. The mean annual precipitation in the Tibetan Highlands varies from less than 10 inches in the west to 20 inches or more in the east and northeast. In Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia precipitation almost everywhere is less than 10 inches annually.

North and Northeast China—The amount and timing of summer rains in North and Northeast China largely determine the size of the autumn harvest. A disproportionate amount of rainfall is concentrated during the mid-June through mid-September period—Ha-erh-pin and Peaking receive 65 and 76 percent, respectively, of their annual total during summer. The erratic character of the precipitation is indicated by the recording at some stations of two-thirds or more of the entire annual precipitation in a single month. In both the North and Northeast the agriculturally important spring months are deficient in precipitation—Peking receives an average of only 2.5 inches for the period March through May. A pattern of spring drought followed by summer floods is common.

South and Southwest China—Greater amounts of precipitation are recorded in South and Southwest China than in the North, and an appreciably higher proportion occurs during the autumn-spring period. Rainfall is adequate everywhere for growing irrigated rice, but the timing of the rains and variations in amounts are critical to highest yields and to the extent of feasible double-cropping. For example, summer drought is at times a problem in the middle Yangtze valley, including parts of the agriculturally rich provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi, and it is a limiting factor in the extension of the area of double-cropped rice. The most dependable precipitation is in the mountain-rimmed Szechwan Basin, where the mean annual precipitation varies from about 37 to 45 inches. Although these yearly totals are somewhat lower than for many stations in Southwest and South China, spring and autumn precipitation is ample and reliable, contributing to the noted agricultural productivity of the region.

In western China the effects of the Asian circulation patterns are modified by mountain ranges, elevation, and other physical factors. There is little precipitation due to the alignment, extent, and high elevations of the mountain ranges that form the eastern and southern borders of the region. Temperatures exhibit great extremes—from the intense heat of the Turfan Depression to the bitter cold in the high mountains and plateaus. Microclimates are common in mountainous areas where local conditions of wind, sun, and elevation are the critical climatic factors.

Precipitation Regions—Precipitation is the single most important climatic element in China because of its vital relationship to agriculture. Two major precipitation regions exist: 1) subhumid-to-humid eastern China, including all of South China and most of North and Northeast China, where annual precipitation is at least 20 inches, and 2) semiarid-to-arid western China, comprising nearly all of Sinkiang and most of the Tibetan Highlands and Inner Mongolia, where the mean annual precipitation ranges from less than 5 to 20 inches.

In eastern China, which contains nearly all of the population and agricultural land, the amount of precipitation varies significantly from north to south. Mean annual precipitation averages 20 to 30 inches in much of North and Northeast China, increasing southward to approximately 40 inches along the Yangtze river. South of the Yangtze the annual precipitation is at least 40 inches almost everywhere, and in some areas it is nearly double this amount.

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The North American locations indicated have temperatures and rainfall somewhat similar to areas in China. Comparisons such as these can only be suggestive.
Agriculture

Agriculture is the pivotal sector of the Chinese economy. In spite of intensive and highly publicized efforts to industrialize and to develop a nuclear energy capability, most Chinese today—as in centuries past—make their living from the land. Agriculture must not only provide food and clothing for some 750 to perhaps 900 million people, increasing at the rate of nearly 20 million a year, but it also must produce raw materials for industry and agricultural products for export. Thus one of China’s most pressing and persistent challenges has long been not only to maintain but to increase the supply of food and agricultural products.

Expansion of Cultivated Area—It appears unlikely that agricultural output can be significantly increased by bringing new lands into cultivation. Almost all cultivated land—about 11 percent of China’s land area—is located in the eastern half of the country. Although some new land has been brought into cultivation during the past 20 years, it has not offset losses caused by the expansion of urban and industrial areas, the construction of reservoirs, and the salinization and erosion of productive land. The potential for opening new land in western China or the Northeast to cultivation is limited because of aridity, short growing season, and other inhibiting physical factors.

Institutional Changes—Initially, the PRC relied upon institutional changes—the collectivization of rural life—rather than the investment of capital and the application of scientific resources as the principal vehicle to stimulate agricultural growth. Collectivization did produce short-term results in remedying such problems as land fragmentation, small holdings, excessive field division strips and burial sites, and the lack of cooperative development and use of irrigation facilities. Accomplishments, however, fell short of the needs. The establishment of the commune (1958) probably was a final effort to use institutional change as a means to markedly boost agricultural production.

Post-1960 Developments—Three successive years of very poor harvests (1959-61) led to a reexamination of agricultural policy. One consequence of these poor harvests was the import of grain, in the amount of about 3 to 6 million tons annually, a practice that has continued until the present. In 1962, in a major break with past development policies, China allocated a larger share of state investment to agriculture, and industry was directed to produce, for example, more chemical fertilizer and electric pumps for agriculture.

Increased industrial support to agriculture and the concentration of effort on the most productive farmlands has enabled the Chinese to substantially increase grain production in recent years. Agricultural productivity has also been enhanced by the avoidance of policies that would further restrict peasant incentives. In particular, productivity has been stimulated by abandonment of restrictive measures inhibiting private enterprise. The cultivation of small private plots and the encouragement of private pig and poultry raising have been beneficial to production. Recent agricultural priorities have been directed toward increased use of chemical fertilizer, improved seed, greater quantities of insecticides, additional pumps for irrigation, and improved tools. Basic to all plans for increased agricultural production is the need for continued improvement in land management and the coordination of land and water conservancy programs.
Maximum Length of Growing Season

The maximum length of the plant-growing season is defined as that period of time during which daily mean temperatures are above 42.8°F (6°C). Though frosts may occur near the beginning and end of this period, they are not commonly killing frosts. The plant-growing season as defined does not indicate the specific growing season for any particular crop.

Composition of Average Daily Diet

People's Republic of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals, potatoes, and other starchy foods</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruits</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat, eggs, fish, and milk</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals, potatoes, and other starchy foods</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruits</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat, eggs, fish, and milk</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes fats, oils, pulses, nuts, seeds, sugar, and other sweets

Rice harvesting in Kwangtung Province. Hand labor remains the rule for most fieldwork in most areas of China. Harvesting of certain crops, however, particularly those grown in large, relatively flat dry fields, is sometimes mechanized. Increasing official emphasis is being given to the mechanization of agriculture.

Drying rice on threshing floor. Rice is being spread in field rows to dry after threshing. The products resulting from threshing are being stored in rectangular rice straw piles and circular rice grain storage bins seen in the background. The degree of mechanization evident here is usually found only in larger farm units such as communes or state farms.
Agriculture

Oases—Agricultural potential limited by availability of irrigation water. Wide variety of food grains, industrial crops (cotton), and fruit and vegetable specialties—grapes and melons.

Millet-Corn-Winter Wheat in combination, assuming than winter wheat. Kaoli and buckwheat widespread the uplands.

Tibetan Highlands—High elevations limit cultivation mainly to fast-maturing barley. Some tubers and hardy vegetables grown; wheat and other grains planted at lower elevations.

Szechwan Rice—Single crop rice followed by wheat, rape, or peas is common cropping system. Corn and sweet potatoes extensively cultivated in non-irrigated fields.
Corn-Kaoliang-Soybeans — Corn acreage recently increased; grown in rotation with kaoliang and leguminous crops, such as soybeans. Spring wheat, millet and other food grains grown; sugar beets locally important.

Spring Wheat — Spring wheat predominant grain. Yields fluctuate widely, except where irrigation water available. Millet, oats, buckwheat and oilseeds also significant crops.

Szechwan Rice — One crop of rice is. Wheat, beans, rapseseed, or other crops commonly follow rice. Subtropical crops commonly valleys.

Rice-Tea — One crop rice traditional, but two crops harvested in some areas. Wheat, rapeseed, or peas often follow single crop rice; green fertilizer crops usually follow in two crop rice areas.

Double-Crop Rice — Two crops of rice harvested annually throughout most of the region; three crops of rice grown in parts of Hainan. Some wheat, winter legumes, rapseseed or green fertilizer crops follow late rice crop. Sugarcane important secondary crop in Kwangtung; other subtropical crops widespread.

Most significant agricultural division in China—along Huai Ho and upper Han Shui valleys—separates rice-growing southern provinces from the dry-grain-growing northern provinces where wheat, and coarse grains dominate. Sweet or white potatoes grown in all regions.

Rice-Winter Wheat — Agricultural transition zone between the North and South; to the north little rice grown; to the south some wheat is grown, but not as a major crop. One crop rice predominates, with wheat often sown in fall after rice harvest. Wheat also planted in dry fields. Cotton important industrial crop.
Minerals and Metals

China is relatively well endowed with most minerals and metals, is a significant world producer of several mineral products, and possesses sufficient reserves to support major industrial expansion. Antimony and tungsten reserves are believed to be the largest in the world, and reserves of aluminium ores, lead, magnesite, manganese, molybdenum, mercury, and tin are substantial. In chronic short supply, however, are chrome, nickel, and cobalt, used primarily in the production of a wide range of special steels.

Development of Minerals Industry—The regional pattern of mining activity reflects historical and political factors as well as mineral distribution. Early developments were financed largely by foreign capital, and the mines that were opened tended to be located in or near foreign concessions and areas under foreign occupation. Thus, most of the mining activity of that period was concentrated in the coastal provinces and in southern Manchuria. After the assumption of power by the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1928 and, more importantly, by the present government in 1949, improved transportation and geological explorations resulted in the wider development of the minerals industry in the interior provinces. Nevertheless, the older developed centers of the minerals industry of Northeast China and the provinces of the South and Southwest continue to be the most important producing areas.

Ferrous Metals and Ferroalloy Minerals—China's supply of ferrous and ferroalloy minerals is sufficient to support a major iron and steel industry. Iron ore deposits, mostly low grade and requiring beneficiation, are fairly widespread, although nearly all of the major mining areas at present are located north of the Yangtze. Deposits now being worked include those near An-shan in Liaoning, the mines northwest of Peking, the mines in the Pai-yun-o-po area north of Pao-tou, and the mines near Ta-ye-h and Ma-an-shan in the Yangtze valley. The high-grade ores mined on Hai-nan Tao are mostly exported. Numerous other iron ore deposits exist, and the output from ore bodies in Kansu, Kwei-chow, and Kwangtung is potentially great.

Ferroalloys, except for chrome, nickel, and cobalt, are plentiful. Numerous tungsten mines dot the Nan Ling, with the single most important concentration appearing in the area of the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border. Most of China's molybdenum is mined from a very large deposit in Liaoning. Manganese reserves are also considerable, with the mines in the Hsiang-fan area of Hunan supplying most of China's current requirements; in addition, significant reserves occur in other areas of South China and in Liaoning.

Nonferrous Metals and Minerals—Extensive reserves of most nonferrous ores provide a substantial base for the industrial development of China's economy. Major tin deposits and some deposits of lead-zinc are mined in the Ko-chiu area of southern Yunnan; copper deposits are widely distributed, with the more important mining areas located in Yunnan, Kansu, and Hupeh. Other nonferrous minerals include widely distributed aluminium ores and magnesite, a mineral found in abundance in Liaoning Province.

Recent Developments—China has overcome the drastic decrease in production of minerals and metals that followed the collapse of the Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet technical and material assistance in the early 1960's. By 1970 output of most minerals and metals had exceeded the Leap Forward peak levels. Much of the current effort is centered on increasing production through the continued construction of processing facilities, the purchase abroad of new plants and equipment, the introduction of new techniques, and the further diversification of products. The industry has also made progress in training technicians and industrial workers.
Capacity for Refined Production in Relation to Domestic Needs

SURPLUS

- Antimony
- Magnesite

ADEQUATE

- Aluminum
- Lead

DEFICIENT

- Copper

Present Mineral Reserves

WORLD’S LARGEST

- Antimony
- Tungsten

CONSIDERABLE

- Aluminum
- Magnesite
- Mercury

ADEQUATE

- Copper
- Molybdenum
- Iron
- Zinc

UNKNOWN

- Nickel

World Production of Four Strategic Minerals and Metals, 1969

Antimony

- China: 18.8%
- Mexico: 18.3%
- USSR: 10.4%
- Bolivia: 10.2%
- South Africa: 27.5%
- Other: 20.1%

Magnesite

- China: 15.2%
- Other: 9.2%
- North Korea: 6.7%
- Russia: 6.3%
- Austria: 20.3%
- Czechoslovakia: 15.3%

Tin

- China: 19.9%
- Thailand: 19.6%
- Malaysia: 10.2%
- United Kingdom: 12.5%
- USSR: 12.5%

Tungsten

- China: 15.4%
- Other: 10.5%
- United States: 15.4%
- USSR: 14.4%

Native copper smelting furnaces in Southwest China. Furnaces such as these flourished during the 18th and 19th centuries furnishing copper for the imperial mints in Peking. During the Leap Forward (1958-60), similar primitive “backyard furnaces” were built by the thousands—principally to produce pig iron.

Extracting and loading tin ore at the Ta-ch'ang mine complex, Kwangsi. Tin and bauxite are the principal minerals mined at this 200-year-old site.
Mineral and Metal Mining

Ferrous and Ferroalloy
- Fe Iron ore
- Mn Manganese
- Mo Molybdenum
- W Tungsten

Nonferrous
- Al Aluminum
- Sb Antimony
- Cu Copper
- Pb Lead and Zinc
- Mg Magnesite
- Hg Mercury
- Sn Tin

Names and boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.
China's energy resources are sufficient to support a major industrialization program. Coal reserves and hydroelectric potential are very large, comparing favorably with those in the United States and the USSR; petroleum resources appear adequate to support substantial increases in production over the next 10 years.

Coal—Coal accounted for about 90 percent of all the primary energy available in China as of 1970. Total reserves are estimated to range from 1.0 to 1.5 trillion tons; proved reserves probably range from 70 to 80 billion tons, placing China third in the world after the United States and the USSR. Most of the coal reserves are located in Shensi and Szechwan, although deposits of various sizes are claimed to have been discovered in every province. Chinese coals range from lignite to anthracite, with bituminous types predominating. Most of the deposits are poor to fair in quality and must be upgraded by preparation and cleaning before use. There are ample reserves of good coking coal, but in some areas they are far removed from the widely dispersed cake plants.

Coal production in China has ranged from 25 to 30 million tons annually during the 1930's to between 200 to 300 million tons annually during the past decade. In recent years production has fluctuated because of the economic downturn of 1961-62 and the disruptions (1967-68) caused by the Cultural Revolution. Efforts have been made to increase production in coal-deficient areas of the South, but local self-sufficiency has not yet been attained. Current policy emphasizes the working of small local mines, using labor-intensive methods of coal extraction. A similar policy during the Leap Forward created havoc in the industry, but it appears that operations are now being more carefully planned and implemented.

Trade—China is a small net exporter of coal to traditional markets in Japan, Hong Kong, and nearby Asian countries. Exports in 1970 amounted to less than 1 percent of total production. China imports a small amount of anthracite from North Vietnam.

Petroleum—the exploration and development of new petroleum resources has had high priority. Peak yearly production of crude oil before 1949 was slightly more than 300,000 tons, including the output derived from oil shale. Since then, large new petroleum fields have been discovered, and production increased to 18 million tons by 1970. China's total production in 1970, however, amounted to about 14 days' output in the United States, placing the PRC at approximately the same level of production as Mexico or such smaller Middle East producers as Oman and Qatar. By 1966, China had developed an integrated petroleum industry and achieved self-sufficiency in petroleum. The continuing low level of imports since that time has been a negligible factor in the total supply of petroleum. The industry remains small, however, and by world standards China is neither a major producer nor consumer of petroleum.

Oil exploration activity during the 1950's was concentrated in areas of known or potential oil resources such as the arid basins in Kansu, Tsinshing, and Sinkiang. Of the several new oilfields discovered during this period, the Karamai field in Sinkiang and the fields in the western portion of the Tsaidam Basin proved to be productive. By 1960 these new fields, along with the older Yü-men field in western Kansu, provided the bulk of China's crude oil. These major producing areas were located at great distances from the principal centers of consumption, however, and their development was hindered by inadequate and costly transportation. In recent years oilfields have been discovered and developed in Northeast and North China, areas that are well located in terms of centers of consumption and available transportation. The famed Ta-ch'ing oilfield in Heilungkiang, where development began in 1960, now accounts for more than half of China's production of crude oil. A more recent discovery—the Sheng-t'u oilfield—is believed to be approaching large-scale production and could contribute significantly to future output. The former Japanese shale oil facilities in Fu-shun have been modernized and continue in operation, contributing to total output, however, amounts to less than 10 percent.

Petroleum Refineries—Most of China's refineries are located in the major consuming areas. The large refinery at the Ta-ch'ing oilfield, designed and built entirely by the Chinese, includes catalytic reforming and delayed coking units, in addition to distillation and thermal cracking facilities. Since 1960, other refineries have been constructed by the Chinese at Nan-ch'ing and more recently at Peking. The Peking refinery includes catalytic cracking facilities. Refineries at Dairen, Chin-hsi, Chin-chou, and Shanghai, constructed before 1949, have since been modernized and expanded. China's first modern refinery was designed and installed by Soviet technicians prior to 1960 at Lan-chou, a rail hub midway between the major producing and consuming areas at that time. The refinery has since been expanded by the Chinese; it reports the production of catalytic cracked, coking, vacuum, resid, and polymerization units, as well as distillation and thermal cracking facilities. Other refineries are located in the producing areas at Tu-shan-tzu, Karamai, Leng-hu, Yu-men, and Nan-ch'ung. Refining facilities also exist at the shale oil production plants in the North-east, at Fu-shun, and in South China at Mau-ming. A small refinery is also operating in the western portions of the Szechwan Basin. The continued expansion of refinery capacity apparently has kept pace with increasing crude oil production, and output of petroleum products has grown steadily. At the same time, modernization and the introduction of new processing techniques have improved both the quality and variety of product output.

Electric Power—China's electric power industry meets present demands, although the extent of development and the level of technology employed are under Western standards. Thermal electric powerplants, mostly coal fired, account for over 70 percent of the installed generating capacity of the country; hydroelectric plants make up the rest. Despite the enormous potential, the development of hydroelectric power continues to be slow.

The distribution of coal and hydroelectric resources is complementary. North and Northeast China are major coal producing areas with large coal reserves and relatively limited waterpower resources. In contrast, South China and parts of Southwest China apparently lack large coal reserves but possess immense hydroelectric resources. Many of the best potential hydroelectric sites are located in Yunnan, western Szechwan, and eastern Tibet—in sparsely populated areas distant from urban and industrial centers.

Most of China's electric power facilities are concentrated in the industrialized Northeast, in the Peking area, and in the Shang-hai-Nan-ch'ing region. The principal powerplants as well as the three major transmission networks serve these areas. Separate power systems, comprising a number of small plants with rudimentary interconnections, serve the main industrial and urban centers in the densely populated middle Yangtze valley, Szechwan basin, and scattered areas of South China extending from Chekiang on the coast to Yunnan in the Southwest. Elsewhere, small isolated plants are situated at important towns, mining centers, and manufacturing plants.

Many of China's electric power facilities were developed by USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East German technicians, working on a base left by the Japanese. Since the termination of large-scale Soviet and East European assistance after the Sino-Soviet rift, however, China has completed a number of unfinished projects and designed new generating plants. China now is able to manufacture fairly large-sized generating equipment, with indigenous design innovations such as water cooling. Smaller equipment is patterned for the most part after Soviet designs.

Installed electric generating capacity in China has increased from a low of about 1.8 million kilowatts in 1949 to about 18.1 million kilowatts in 1970. Power production has shown a similar increase, with year-to-year variations reflecting the economic and political vicissitudes of the 1960-70 period.
A major hydroelectric powerplant in Hunan Province. The lack of coal resources in South and Southwest China is offset by the availability of numerous sites suitable for the construction of hydroelectric powerplants. This plant provides power for industries in Chuchou, located near Hsiang T'an and Ch'angsha, an area of growing industrial importance.

### Electric Power

**Installed Capacity**
- Million kilowatts

**Gross Production**
- Billion kilowatt-hours

**Coal Production**
- Million metric tons

**Crude Oil Production**
- Million metric tons
Industry

The industry of the People's Republic of China has expanded impressively from the small base inherited over two decades ago. Nevertheless, Chinese industry remains relatively undeveloped in relation to the country's endowment of natural resources, its huge population, and the ambitions of its leadership. Although China is second only to Japan among Asian nations in gross industrial output, China ranks far behind Japan in per capita output.

Industrial Resources—China's reserves of most industrial raw materials (including many ferrous and nonferrous metals, mineral fuels, and hydroelectric power) appear adequate to support a diversified manufacturing complex equal to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Principal industrial bottleneck—apart from insufficient reserves of a few important metals such as chrome, nickel, and cobalt—are the small number of modern plants and the shortage of skilled managers, engineers, and scientists. China continues to rely heavily on foreign technology for the design and manufacture of complex processing, refining, and finishing equipment.

Growth of Industry—Industrial development prior to 1949 was characterized by the localization of industry in southern Manchuria and in leased and treaty port areas such as Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Fu-chou, and Canton. Shanghai was opened to trade in 1845, and it became the principal center of light industry. Subsequently, Manchuria was developed as a base for heavy industry by the Japanese during the 1930's. The period of war and civil conflict that followed severely inhibited industrial growth, and many industrial enterprises were disrupted or destroyed. By 1949 industrial production had declined to about one-third of the peak prewar level attained in 1936. With the return of peace and foreign assistance, most branches of industry recovered or surpassed prewar production levels by the end of 1952. The industrial economy then experienced a rapid rise in output during the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), a frenzied increase in tempo during the Leap Forward (1958-60), an abrupt decline of production following the cutoff of Soviet aid and the collapse of the Leap Forward program (1961-62), and a period of gradual recovery after 1963. Disruptions during the Cultural Revolution caused another downturn in 1967-68, but by 1970 recovery was generally complete and many of China's basic industries were producing at record levels (see Table II). Further industrial growth is anticipated during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75).

Regional Distribution of Industry—Although regional statistics are fragmentary for the post-1949 period and almost totally lacking for the years after 1960, China appears to have made considerable progress in building up industrial centers in the interior. In 1952, prior to the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, the distribution of industrial production in coastal and inland areas was approximately as follows (in percent):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Coastal</th>
<th>Inland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine tools</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton cloth</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To lessen the concentration of industry along the coast, the First Five-Year Plan specified that two-thirds of 700 major new industrial projects would be located in the inland provinces. Accordingly, inland cities such as Pao-tou, T'ai-yuan, Wu-han, Sian, Lan-chou, and Ch'eng-tu greatly expanded in size and population. An estimated two-thirds of the 300 projects for which the Soviet Union agreed to supply material and technical assistance during the 1950-67 period also were part of the inland development program. By 1956 Chinese planners realized the importance of upgrading and increasing production in traditional industrial areas while at the same time constructing new plants away from the old centers. During the period of readjustment following the collapse of the Leap Forward and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet aid, regional development was seriously affected. Many of the small and uneconomic factories that opened during 1958-60 were closed. Nearly one-third of the large facilities scheduled for completion by 1967 on the basis of Soviet aid were dropped or left uncompleted. Development of the "hinterland" is still a basic goal of the Chinese, however, and they are once again building both large- and small-scale enterprises in interior areas.

For purposes of administration and planning, the PRC grouped its 29 first-order administrative divisions into six "economic coordination regions." Table I defines these regions and indicates their relative importance in several basic industries.

Northeast China—Northeast China remains as China's major industrial area and the foremost center of heavy industry. The region is the largest producer of electric power, coal, iron and steel, aluminum, gold, natural and synthetic petroleum, timber, paper, trucks, and a variety of machinery and equipment. A northward extension of the Northeast's industrialized area has taken place with new facilities constructed in Kirin and Heilungkiang.

North China—North China ranks third in total industrial production. Its major industrialized area is located in a triangle formed by the cities of Peking, T'ang-shan, and Tientsin. The region is a major producer of steam locomotives, tractors, iron and steel, chemicals, electric power, textiles, and paper. Except in the Tientsin- T'ang-shan coastal zone, most of this development has occurred since 1949; the buildup of T'ai-yuan is an example. Industrial development of the region has been aided by plentiful supplies of local coal and a relatively good railroad network.

East China—East China, though smallest in area, has nearly one-third of China's population. It leads in the manufacture of textiles and many other consumer goods, is second in total industrial production, and ranks high in the production of chemicals, electric power, and machinery. Much of the region's productive capacity is located in Shanghai, China's largest industrial and commercial metropolis.

Central-South China—Central-South China, ranking second after the East in population, is China's largest producer of tractor and refined sugar. Light industry—sugar, paper, silk, textiles, and various handicrafts—is a specialty of the Canton area. Heavy industry is concentrated in the middle Yangtze Valley at Wu-han and Hsiao-fan and at Lo-yang in northern Honan. The region is an important producer of raw materials, particularly nonferrous metals, such as tungsten, manganese, and antimony.

Southwest China—The predominantly mountainous and formerly isolated provinces of Southwest China have experienced a modest and diversified industrial buildup since 1949. Mining is important; the region probably leads the nation in tin production, and it ranks high in copper and lead. Using the limited industrial base started during World War II, new heavy industrial facilities specializing in electronic equipment and chemicals have been constructed in the Szechwan Basin, where growing industrial areas are centered at Ch'ing-ch'ing and Ch'eng-tu.

Northwest China—Northwest China, by far the largest region, is the least industrialized. Practically all industry in this region has been developed since 1949. Apart from the petroleum industry, which in recent years has become greatly overshadowed by developments in the Northeast (see map Fuels and Power), important industrial facilities are located at Lan-chou and Sian. Soviet assistance in the industrial development of the region was considerable, but a substantial part of the growing petrochemical industry at Lan-chou is being constructed with equipment and complete plants imported from the West.
The map depicts first- and second-ranking regions for each of 11 key industries. Although China’s industrial capacity is predominantly in the eastern half of the country, few regions contain as much as 50% of an industry’s total capacity.

### Estimated Percent of Total National Industrial Capacity, by Economic Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>North Central-South</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Northwest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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*Northeast China: Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning provinces
East China: Shantung, Kiangsu, Anwei, Chekiang, Kiang, and Fukien provinces, and Shanghai Municipality
North China: Hopeh and Shansi provinces, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and Peking and Tientsin municipalities
Central-South China: Honan, Hupeh, Hunan and Kwangtung provinces, and the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region
Southwest China: Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan provinces, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region
Northwest China: Kansu and Shensi provinces, and the Sinkiang Uighur and Ningxia Hui autonomous regions

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*Official statistics for the period 1936-57; estimates for later years.
Human Resources and Economy

### Human Resources

**Population**
- PRC: 651
- US: 453
- USSR: 2090
- Japan: 2230
- India: 171

**Labor Force**
- PRC: 341
- US: 86
- USSR: 170
- Japan: 51
- India: 111

**Literacy**
- PRC: 95
- US: almost complete
- USSR: 465
- Japan: 978
- India: 24

### Production

**Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) 1970**
- PRC: 341
- US: 86
- USSR: 170
- Japan: 51
- India: 111

**GNP Index**
- 1960: 100
- 1965: 150
- 1970: 200

**Per Capita GNP Index**
- 1960: 100
- 1965: 150
- 1970: 200

**Industrial Index**
- 1957-100
- 1960
- 1965
- 1970

**Agricultural Index**
- 1957-100
- 1960
- 1965
- 1970

### Trade

**Trade with Non-Communist and Communist Countries**

**Principal Trading Partners 1970**
- Communist (820)
- Non-Communist (3435)
- Total 4255 million US $
Historical Perspective

China’s rulers have been preoccupied with frontier problems for more than 2,000 years. Historically, Chinese frontier policy sought by various techniques to control steppe-based nomadic peoples—the "barbarians"—of Central Asia, Mongolia, and Manchuria who periodically attacked the Chinese Empire. Although this threat had virtually disappeared by the beginning of the 19th century, it was soon replaced by another—the European powers—who forced a weakened China to sign several border treaties. These treaties established fixed boundaries in frontier territories where Chinese tributary relationships had existed. The present bitter Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian border disputes thus have roots in the past, traditional Chinese views and frontier concepts afford perspective in assessing the current boundary controversies.

The “Core” Concept—Historically, China has consisted of two distinct regions: an inner “core” of Han Chinese settlement, culture, and direct political administration, territorially equivalent in most periods to the old concept of “China Proper”; and an outer ring or zone of buffer territories, originally inhabited almost entirely by non-Han peoples controlled or influenced in some way by China. Both zones have fluctuated in size, but the core region, throughout most of Chinese history, has consisted of the plains and hills of the middle and lower Huang Ho (Yellow River) Basin, the Yangtze Valley lowlands including the Szechwan Basin, and other major rice-growing lowlands elsewhere in South China. The extent of significant Chinese influence in the buffer territories also has varied historically, depending upon the power of the Chinese central government and the strength of indigenous groups. Generally these territories included what is now Sinkiang Province, Mongolia (both inner and outer), and the Tibetan Highlands. Northeast China, or Manchuria, is a former frontier territory that within the past century has become entirely Chinese. At times Korea and what is now North Vietnam have also been in buffer status and under some degree of Chinese control.

The size of the “core” as a proportion of the total territory of China has varied. During the height of Manchu power in the late 18th century, for example, the “core” was roughly 1.4 million square miles—less than a third of China’s area of almost 5 million square miles that then included Mongolia, much of Central Asia, and the Amur basin. Continued population growth and expansion of the cultivated area has increased the size of today’s “core” to about 1.8 million square miles—almost half of the total area (3.7 million square miles) of China.

Techniques of Control—From very early times walls were constructed in the North and Northwest to separate the “core” from the outer territories. They were built to control contact—peaceful or warlike—with nomadic groups of the steppes. Occasional use was made of walls in South China for similar purposes. In contrast, the outer limits of the buffer territories normally were vague and unmarked, changing with the ebb and flow of power in the steppes, deserts, and forests of Inner and North Asia. Chinese influence in these outer territories was periodically reestablished by military conquest or by the threat of force coupled with diplomacy. The territories were administered separately from the provinces of China Proper, and Chinese influence often was absent for long periods of time. A variety of indirect techniques helped maintain Chinese authority: border garrisons and military colonies were established; alliances (sometimes by marriage) arranged; titles conferred and subsidies paid; and trade regulated.

The Tribute System—In Chinese eyes the outer buffer territories were surrounded by yet another zone of tributary or client states. The Confucian doctrine held that the Chinese ruler—the Son of Heaven—by his virtuous example and influence magnetically drew the “barbarians” from the outside world to appreciate and acknowledge China’s superior culture and civilization. This concept was maintained through the “tribute system,” an institution that in its broadest sense included all aspects of interstate relations. Tribute became formalized in an elaborate ritual; its longevity was due to its successful use as a vehicle for trade. A tribute mission dispatched to the Chinese capital was a profitable privilege, and was not, as often imagined, a humiliating admission of political subjection.

This intricate system of protective buffers and tributary states insulated the compact inner core of China and obscured the actual territorial limits of Chinese political control. This situation conflicted with European concepts of demarcated, rigid boundaries marking the limits of state power. During the 19th century China signed border treaties, grudgingly and under the duress of superior European military strength.

Post-1949 Developments—During the past two decades the Chinese have reestablished and consolidated their authority over outlying territories. Today they are more firmly controlled by the Chinese and are economically better integrated with the “core” than at any other time in history. These developments reflect in part the quickened pace of Han Chinese settlement of the frontier territories and greatly improved communications between Peking and other major centers and outlying districts. Current Chinese sensitivity toward the delimitation of their borders is undoubtedly reinforced by a feeling that past border delineations were accomplished under circumstances that were less than equitable for China.
Sino-Soviet frontier talks commenced in late 1969, following several serious border incidents, but visible signs of progress toward agreement are lacking. Although pubicizing extensive territorial losses resulting from 19th-century Sino-Russian treaties, Peking has indicated a willingness to use the de facto boundary as the basis of a new border settlement. A difficult problem, presumably, has been the ownership of the numerous islands in the Amur and Usori—particularly of Heluoia-tu, the large Russian-occupied island adjacent to Khabarovsk at the confluence of the two rivers.

Basic differences concerning the alignment of the China-India boundary, which were greatly intensified by the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, appear to be too serious to permit resolution in the foreseeable future. China occupies several thousand square miles of desolate plateau and mountain country in the west claimed by India. This disputed territory is crossed by the main Chinese supply route to western Tibet. In the east the de facto border along the high peaks of the Himalayas is the famed McMahon Line, accepted by India but rejected by China. India occupies and administers the rugged hills and mountains of the North East Frontier Agency (N.E.F.A.), most of which is claimed by China.
Peking has been the capital of China more or less continuously for the past 700 years. In ancient times it was significant as a trading center; situated strategically inside the Great Wall, it was at the crossroads of trade flowing between China and areas to the north. Later on it became the home of the Imperial Court and the administrative center of the country. Today, Peking retains its geographic importance as a communications hub but more than ever has become the unquestioned center of China’s political, cultural and military power.

In recent years the population of the city has mushroomed—from slightly more than 2 million in 1949 to more than 7 million today. In part, this growth has resulted from the annexation of sizable tracts at some distance from the built-up area. The territorial limits of Peking Municipality thus include sufficient land—including land for agriculture—to provide for its future growth and to assure its future as a virtually independent economic and administrative entity.

Construction activity to accommodate the rapid growth of the city has resulted in a substantial modification in the appearance of Peking: multi-storied buildings now interrupt the generally low skyline, especially outside the old walled city. The somewhat slower pace of growth recently has permitted a concentration upon the improvement and further development of Peking’s services and utilities. Sanitation and health standards have greatly improved, and the current cleanliness of the city contrasts sharply with the filth that prevailed in the past.

The rapid growth and changes in Peking also are reflected in the industrial character of the city. The former specialization in highly skilled arts and handicrafts has been greatly augmented by a wide range of new and diversified industry. Peking now is an important producer of iron and steel, petrochemicals, electronic and communications equipment, agricultural and automotive equipment, and natural and synthetic fibers.
Prominent Sights in Peking
GAZETTEER

The gazetteer includes all names within the PRC appearing on the six regional maps. After each name is a grid reference relating the grid system overlaying the index map on this page to each regional map. Spelling follows the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. Conventional names - such as Yellow River - sometimes used in the text for clarity, are cross-referenced to the native form which appears on the map. Physical features and administrative names are followed by the notations (Phys) and (Adm) respectively. The following terms occur as generic parts of gazetteer names:

- chen: second-order administrative division (administrative town)
- ch'eng: wall
- ch'i: second-order administrative division (banner)
- ch'iao: stream, section of stream, estuary, lagoon, stream channel
- ch'ih: bridge, lake, pool
- ch'i: canal
- ch'uan: stream
- hai: bay, lake (s), salt lake (s), sound
- ho: stream, section of stream, canal, section of canal, lake, tidal creek, marine channel
- ho-k'ou: stream mouth
- hsia: strait, gorge
- hsien: second-order administrative division (hsien)
- hsü: island (s), rocks in water
- hu: lake, section of lake, lagoon, marsh, reservoir, wetland
- kang: bay, harbor, inlet, tidal creek, sound, marine channel, lagoon, estuary, cove, stream mouth
- k'eng: stream
- k'ou: bay, stream mouth, inlet, cove, pass
- kuan: pass
- la (Tibetan): pass
- lieh-tao: islands
- ling: mountain (s), mountain range, hill, pass
- miao: temple, shrine
- pan-tao: peninsula
- po: lake
- shan: mountain (s), hill (s), peak, range, island (s), rocks in water, point, headland
- shan-k'ou: pass
- shan-mo: mountain range, mountains
- shih: administrative division (municipality)
- shui: stream, section of stream, distributary
- ssu: monastery
- tao: island (s), peninsula, section of island
- ts'o (Tibetan): lake
- wan: bay, cove, inlet, lagoon
- yen-ch'ih: lake